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Cyberspace has diversified and pluralized people’s daily experiences of religion in 
unprecedented ways. By studying several websites and weblogs that have a religious orientation, 
different layers of religious authority including “religious hierarchy, structures, ideology, and 
sources” (Campbell, 2009) can be identified. Also, using Weber’s definition of the three types of 
authority, “rational-legal, traditional, and charismatic” (1968), the specific type of authority that 
is being presented on blogosphere can be recognized.  
The Internet presents a level of liberty for the discussion of sensitive topics in any kind of 
religious cyberspace, specifically the Islamic one. In this way, the Internet is expanding the 
number and range of Muslim voices, which may pose problems for traditional forms of religious 
authority or may suggest new forms of authority in the Islamic world. The interaction between 
the Internet and religion is often perceived as contradictory, especially when it is religion at its 
most conservative practice. While the international and national applications of the Internet have 
increased vastly, local religious communities, especially fundamentalists, perceived this new 
technology as a threat to their local cultures and practices.  
If we look at the Internet as a central phenomenon of contemporary modernity that 
interacts with practiced fundamentalist religious traditions, we can ask how broad the 
interactions are between religious fundamentalism and the Internet and whether these relations 
can be reconciled. More specifically, this thesis presents a study of the junction of the Internet 
and religious fundamentalism reviewing the presentation of Shiite religious authority on the 
Persian blogosphere.  
As a case study, Persian weblogs are studied for content analysis for this thesis. Weblogs’ 
texts are analyzed to find evidences for Shiite beliefs and shared identity, usages and 
interpretations of the main Shiite religious texts, references to the role of recognized Shiite 
leaders, and descriptions of Shiite structural patterns of practices and organizations.  
This research will demonstrate how the Internet has been culturally constructed, 
modified, and adapted to the Iranian community’s needs and how the Shiite fundamentalist 
community of Iran has been affected by it. Based on one of the most structured research in this 
area, the study by Baezilai-Nahon and Barzilai (2005), in this article I identify four principal 
dimensions of religious fundamentalism as they interact with the Internet: hierarchy, patriarchy, 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The Information Technology Revolution, as Manuel Castells (1997) writes, is the biggest 
revolution experienced by humankind; it affects economies, politics and social interactions, as 
well as cultures and religions in the current global order. 
Religious environments are dominated by social and cultural elements. As a result, social 
communication is one of the critical forces that influences people’s religious orientations. As 
Ameli (2009) explains, with the emergence of the Internet as a new technology, an innovative 
“world communication space” has been added to the people’s cultural space and religious 
environment in the real world. The level of religious debate and discussion by participants in the 
virtual world has increased the number of religious websites and weblogs demonstrating the 
demand for religious discourse in cyberspace. Almost all religious groups try to apply this new 
technology to fulfill their goal. As Dawson (2000) writes, “both new and old religious groups 
have migrated to cyberspace with some enthusiasm” (p. 26). Cyberspace has created a “global 
ground” for the expression and reproduction of religion, without any distinction between those 
with a merely local base or religions with a global following. This may develop the potential for 
a distinctive understanding of religion that arises from both a new self-consciousness and the 
accumulative knowledge of religion, made accessible for everyone in cyberspace (Ameli, 2009; 
Lovheim, 2004). 
The emergence of the Internet significantly changes the speed of transmitting religious 
information. The shift from oral and paper-based communication tools to the Internet has 
influenced our understanding of religious texts, religious rituals, religious identity, and 
communities of believers. Religious resources such as holy books and other text-based 
information, as well as audio files of sermons and religious speeches by religious leaders, are 
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now available online for all people who have access to the Internet. Also, new communication 
tools such as online networks and chat rooms make connectivity among people easier. In this 
way, searching for and understanding religious beliefs and practices can occur more rapidly and 
comfortably. For instance, nowadays the Quran is available in an electronic version online and is 
equipped with simple and advanced tools to search for its words and meanings. Therefore, there 
is less need to access libraries, seminaries and religious professionals to find out a specific 
Quranic term; all this information can be found quickly online.  
Additionally, because of the openness of the Internet, it can reveal differences between 
religions, as well as the contradictions and challenges that exist among believers within a 
particular religion. This technology provides a new public forum for religious debates. For 
example, personal weblogs play a key role in representing personal ideas about religious matters. 
They present a level of liberality for the discussion of sensitive topics in any kind of religious 
cyberspace. By studying several websites and weblogs that have a religious orientation, one can 
examine whether or not people interpret various subjects, creeds, or scriptures differently and 
whether such discrepancies in interpretations sometimes come into conflict with official views. 
In fact, as Anderson (2003) mentions, religious authority has often been challenged by mass 
media, such as radio, television and, currently, the Internet.   
The relationship between Islam or the broader Muslim community and the Internet is one 
of the areas currently being researched. From the early stages of the development of the Internet, 
Muslims – like other religious groups – have employed the Internet in at least two main and 
somewhat contradictory ways. First, they use it to alter existing religious authority structures by 
putting forward new approaches to Islam and new interpretations of the holy texts. Second, they 
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use the Internet to express their religious identity and to spread Islamic ideas and viewpoints, as 
well as to preserve traditional and charismatic authorities and to defend established perspectives.  
As Scholz et al. (2008) mention, in the history of Muslim thought and belief, new media 
very often played a key role in the introduction and spread of new religious interpretations, as 
well as the structure of authority. Nowadays, the Internet, like other mass media devices such as 
television and radio, has become the major factor that contributes to the emergence of a Muslim 
counter-public that is not entirely under state control. As Scholz et al. note, one of the principal 
reasons for the strong impact of these forms of media is their accessibility and easy 
reproducibility. Considering these two characteristics, besides other remarkable features such as 
“anonymity”, the Internet creates a new and open ground for individuals to express their 
understandings and perspectives of religion regardless of the directions of religious authorities. 
This illustrates one of the deepest impacts of the Internet on religious structure, religiosity and, 
traditional religious behaviour, which usually includes a strict system of hierarchy and discipline. 
This leads us to the main reason to study this subject, which is to analyse the reciprocal 
influence of the Internet and religion on each other. This thesis defines “religious authority” as 
the main theme that is subjected to challenge in Muslim communities confronting the new 
technology of the Internet. Two major frameworks have been used simultaneously to analyse the 
relationship between the Internet and religion in this thesis. In fact, this research tests a new case 
for the results of the two major studies that have been done by Heidi Campbell (2005, 2007) and 
Karine Barzilai-Nahon and Gad Barzilai (2005).  
Campbell focuses on how religion online provides an important space for studying what 
she refers to as “multiple layers of authority”, which she considers to be religious hierarchy, 
structure, ideology, and text. She examined Christian, Jewish, and Muslim communities to 
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analyse whether religious authority is being influenced by the new technology of the Internet in 
any of these layers in these communities.   
The second framework is Barzilai-Nahon and Barzilai’s study (2005). They introduce a 
new conceptual lens in their study to comprehend how new technology is being utilized in a 
religious community, based on its beliefs and needs. They present a comprehensive study of the 
junction of information technology (IT) and religious fundamentalism among ultra-Orthodox 
Jews. The study aims to demonstrate how the Internet has been culturally constructed, modified, 
and adapted to the community’s needs. It also examines how the Jewish fundamentalist 
community has been affected by the Internet in general and presents new challenges occurred in 
the mutual relationship between the Internet and fundamentalist society.  
Based on the findings of this study, they introduce a new term called “cultured 
technology”. Culture contains flexible variables while technology is believed to have determined 
characteristics and results. This means that culture which is defined as “the shared products of a 
human group or society, including values, language, knowledge, and material objects” (Popenoe, 
2000, p. 518) is affected by material and non-material phenomena. Conversely, technology is 
generally known as a rigid and inflexible phenomenon not influenced by culture. Therefore, the 
term “cultured technology” contains two contradictory elements since there is always a tension 
between culture and technology. However, Barzilai-Nahon and Barzilai show that communities 
do not use technology as is; rather they suggest that technology becomes infused with cultural 
characteristics. For instance, based on their findings it is too simplistic to think that Internet 
technology makes every society more liberal and open to new ideas. In fact, one should not be 
trapped by technology determinism in analysing the impact of the Internet on different 
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communities. In other words, the fact that people can find diverse beliefs and ideas in cyberspace 
does not necessarily make people less fundamentalist.   
After defining religious fundamentalism as “a system of absolute values and practiced 
faith in God that firmly relies on sacred canonical texts”, Barzilai-Nahon and Barzilai (2005) 
refer to cyberspace as “a reflection of contemporary rationale and scientific modernity” (p. 25). 
The rationality of cyberspace confronts the non-rational essence of religious fundamentalism, 
and so religious fundamentalists “see cyberspace as a threat to the cultural preservation of their 
community” (p. 26). Four major dimensions for religious fundamentalism that are challenged by 
the rational essence of the Internet are identified as hierarchy, patriarchy, discipline, and 
seclusion; “the community has become more multifaceted and somewhat more pluralized, but 
also more empowered and more efficient by making the Internet a complimentary space for the 
offline community” (Barzilai-Nahon and Barzilai, 2005, p. 37). 
The initial approach from the Muslim communities toward the Internet was the same as 
what Barzilai-Nahon and Barzilai describe in the Jewish Orthodox community. Both groups tried 
to overcome the threat to their religion and tradition posed by the Internet by first warning their 
members to avoid using it. Later they became Internet users who used the capability of this new 
technology to preserve their religious authority and utilized it in the way that served their goals.  
      By studying the Orthodox Jewish community with regard to the four themes, 
Barzilai-Nahon and Barzilai conclude that although the usage of Internet technology has not 
drastically changed the basic foundations of religiously fundamentalist communities, but more 
plurality in terms of hierarchy, patriarchy, discipline, and seclusion can be seen. Their study 
shows that how religious fundamentalists adapt the Internet to the needs of their religious 
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culture, and how technology has affected the community. Through studying Orthodox Jewish 
community they explain:  
The complex processes that have injected the cyberspace onto the communal space, and 
how and to what degree the traditional structures of the community have been affected, 
preserved and even empowered. The ability to shape … [Internet] usage has assisted 
religious fundamentalists not only to survive, but also to use it for their religious needs. 
As a result, the community has become more multifaceted and somewhat more 
pluralized, but also more empowered and more efficient by making the Internet a 
complimentary space for the offline community. The Internet has been localized, since its 
essence was altered and reconstructed. On the one hand, … [the Internet]  penetration has 
not drastically changed the basic foundations of the religious fundamentalist 
communities. (p. 37) 
 
To date there have been no studies of religious authority on the Internet that examine the 
reciprocal impact of the Iranian Twelver Shiites and the Internet. Thus, this study uses this 
community as a new case test for Campbell’s and Barzilia-Nahon and Barzilai’s frameworks. 
First, the manifestation of Shiite Muslim religious authority on the Internet is analysed, and then 
the major areas of tension in the relationship between the Internet and the Iranian fundamentalist 
Twelver Shiites are studied. 
This thesis examines a part of the Persian blogosphere of Iran in which bloggers discuss 
and explain religious issues such as religious authority and different interpretations of Islamic 
concepts, laws, beliefs, and debates. In their blog posts, they may follow the formal way of 
reading Islamic concepts and present religious authority in a traditional sense. Alternatively, they 
may present new viewpoints for understanding Islamic dogma and present new perspectives 
about religious authority from their own understandings.  
Shiite Persian weblogs have been chosen for this study firstly because Iran is the only 
country that is run by a Shiite government. The consolidation of modern political viewpoints and 
Shiite ideology was the result of the Iranian revolution in 1979. Although the country has had a 
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Shiite central government of the Safavid since the 17
th
 century, religious scholars and clerics did 
not govern the society until the recent revolution. However, the Shiite clerical body always had 
authority over the society, whether in support or opposition of the state. Religious scholars and 
clerics played key roles as a collegial party to the kings in the traditional historical kingship 
system.  
The revolution in 1979, led by the charismatic figure Ayatollah Khomeini, established a 
fundamentalist Shiite clerical regime that has headed the state since then. Thus Shiite dogma has 
become the main framework of the ruling system of Iran. This way, religious scholars and the 
clerical body have run the society as the official government instead of becoming collegial 
institutions functioning besides the political system. The controversial theory of “wilayat al-
faqih” (the rule of the jurist), which is rooted in the Imamate (the authority of the Shiite Imams) 
ideology of the Twelver Shiites, forms a new context for Shiite authority in Iran.     
Since the revolution, specifically after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, Iranian society 
has experienced a more fundamentalist religious viewpoint. Restrictions on discussing religious 
hierarchy, structure, ideology, and interpretation of the religious texts have increased severely. 
At the same time, more rigid disciplines have been applied towards different and oppositional 
perspectives.     
The second reason for choosing Iranian blogosphere in this thesis is that the leaders of the 
Iranian society have always tried to preserve the society from outside ideologies and new 
interpretations of the Shiite dogma. Since the Iranian press is under control by the government, 
oppositional groups have used the Internet to express their views. This can seriously challenge 
the authority of the traditional clerical perspectives, particularly with regard to the role of the 
supreme leader as the highest clerical position leading the society. The Internet thus creates a 
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public sphere for groups to freely express their thoughts and challenge each other as well. As 
Sreberny and Khiabany (2010) state “the blogistan
1
 has become a space of contention between 
the people and the state”. This occurs despite the government’s use of several tools and 
techniques to restrict access to the Internet to prevent people from arguing about controversial 
religio-political issues. As Kelly and Elting mention (2008), “given the repressive media 
environment in Iran today, blogs may represent the most open public communications platform 
for political discourse” (p. 2). In fact, serious unveiled clashes have occurred in the online public 
sphere of Iranian community, which never happened in its offline world pertaining to religious 
authority and its eligibility to run the society.         
The third reason is that for the study of Iranian blogosphere, which is linked to the 
previous one, is that the Internet gives Iranians the opportunity of being heard. The inherent 
freedom of the Internet, which includes anonymity and decentralized control, has allowed 
infamous Iranian journalists and intellectuals to be known publicly both inside Iran and 
internationally. The Iranian of the Diaspora, a large number of Iranians who live outside Iran,
2
 
has also played a critical role in presenting different perspectives with regard to religious 
ideology through the Internet. The Persian blogistan has become a space for getting informal 
information about Iranian’s beliefs and their everyday life, which contains several religio-
political complexities. The online life of the new generation of Iranians around the world is 
directly associated with different layers of offline religious authority. Studying the Persian 
                                                 
1
 The whole body of the Persian blogosphere.  
2
 The rate of the immigration from Iran to Western countries and the US has increased drastically in the 30 years 
after the revolution of 1979. The first generation of these immigrants were mostly concerned about political issues 
and their situation in the Shah’s regime. The war between Iran and Iraq (1980s) was another reason for the 
immigration. However, during the last 20 years, the number of refugees (who were in danger because of their 
political and religious perspectives) and university students who seek for a better educational level and a better life 
standards were increased.      
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blogistan can also reveal the tensions that have been generated as a result of a confrontation 




Following the frameworks that Barzilia-Nahon and Campbell suggest, this research is 
looking to answer these major questions:  
1) How does a religious fundamentalist community, such as the Iranian Twelver Shiites, 
adapt to the Internet to fulfil its needs; and how does the Internet technology, specifically 
weblogs, affect the community? 
2) What are the major areas of tension between the Internet and the Iranian religious 
fundamentalist community? Could hierarchy, patriarchy, discipline and seclusion be 
considered as major dimensions of tension for this case?  
3) What forms of religious authority—roles, structures, theology/beliefs and texts—do 
bloggers refer to in their weblogs?  
4) Do bloggers affirm or challenge the sources of religious authority they refer to and in 
what ways? 
5) Do new forms of religious authority shape on the Internet? Do bloggers become new 
source of authority for the Iranian society? Do women or the Iranians of the Diaspora 
play authoritative roles online? 
The following steps help answer the above questions: 1) reviewing the literature for the 
meaning of authority, religious authority and the presentation of religion on the Internet; 2) 
looking briefly at the history of Shiism and the characteristics of religious authority among Shiite 
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communities; 3) outlining the related incidents in the contemporary religio-political context of 
Iranian society that are reflected on the Internet; 4) analysing the blog posts based on the 
literature and the theoretical framework; 5) discussing the relationship between the Internet and 
the religious fundamentalist community. These steps enable us to analyse the manifestation of 
Shiite religious authority on the Persian blogosphere to see what forms of religious authority are 
being presented, and determine whether they are being challenged or affirmed. Also these steps 
will help us to analyze four dimensions of tension and symbiotic relations between the Internet 
and Iranian society as a religious fundamentalist community.  
 
Methodology 
In the online world, blogs which publish personal stories and perspectives in a global and 
public sphere have a significant role in challenging and affirming religious authority among 
different religious communities. To explain the role of this new online tool and its effects on 
religious communities, we should first define what a “weblog” is. Nardi and Herring (as cited in 
Campbell, 2010) define the word “blog” as a short form for “web log”, that is  
an online journal focused on personal content, composed of individual entries, which are 
frequently updated by a human author and whose contents are intended for a public 
audience… blogs allow individuals the opportunity to self-publish narratives on a variety 
of subjects and passions using text, images and even video to help express their thoughts. 
(p. 253) 
  
The weblogs that are being analysed in this paper are not developed by ‘official’ Muslim 
organizations and/or government. These weblogs may present the existing forms of religious 
authority or offer new perspectives that are defined as more liberal/democratic viewpoints. 
Although the Internet is still ultimately controlled and dominated by offline authorities, as Turner 
(2007) mentions, bloggers use the Internet as a means of bypassing the traditional gatekeepers of 
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Muslim orthodoxy. Bloggers usually tend to provide opportunities for discussion and discourse 
outside the official culture.  
For this project, a qualitative method was used. As Creswell (2009) writes, qualitative 
research is a tool for uncovering and analysing the meaning that a person or group of people 
attribute to a social issue. One of the other characteristics of qualitative methods that will enable 
this research to answer the main research questions is that qualitative methodology allows 
researchers to collect data themselves through examining documents (Creswell, 2009); such as 
investigating weblogs’ posts for specific concepts.  
This research can also be defined as a case study, which is one of the strategies in a 
qualitative approach. Case studies are a type of inquiry that explores a programme, event, 
activity, process, or even one or more persons, in depth (Creswell, 2009). The method that is 
applied for gathering data in this research is ‘content analysis’ of five cases. Content analysis 
offers a foundation for a multidimensional look at the text of weblogs in order to investigate the 
concepts and symbols of religious authority that are expressed therein.  
The text published in the weblogs has been read and coded in order to analyze the 
relationships between the different variables. The existence of religious authority and power 
relationships can be examined through those posts in the context of the stated research questions 
regarding what forms of religious authority – roles, structures, beliefs and texts – bloggers refer 
to and whether they affirm or challenge traditional sources of religious authority. Moreover, the 
blogs’ posts have been analyzed to see whether any type of tension between religion and the 
Internet has arisen in the areas of hierarchy, patriarchy, discipline and seclusion.  
Information has been gathered about the traits of Persian Shiite bloggers as to how they 
present their religious beliefs in the blogging context, and how their blog commentary presents 
12 
 
their perceptions of religious authority. In order to answer the research questions, the study 
focused on only one religious group – Shiite bloggers – in order to draw more cohesive 
conclusions. The sampling process involved selecting blogs whose authors explicitly identified 
themselves as Shiite Muslims or otherwise connected themselves with the Shiite faith (e.g., 
through Shiite organizations) in the blog’s profile or the content of the blog posts.  
Five Iranian blogs have been chosen based on their posts, which are directly related to 
religio-political issues of the Iranian Shiite community, and their popularity, based on the 
number of readers. All the bloggers write in the Persian language. Among these five weblogs, 
two of them are in support of the fundamentalist perspective and three of them are categorized as 
modernist-reformist.   
 
Introducing Cases: Five Weblogs from the Persian Blogosphere 
Referring to Lawrence’s study (2002), this thesis is focusing on the private vector of 
contemporary Islamic religion online, weblogs and bloggers, which includes individuals who 
have neither institutional nor political clout, but they present issues from a Shiite fundamentalist 
community, namely Iran, on the Internet.  
The history of blogging dates back to 1994, when Justin Hall started to post his diary 
entries on his website (Rettberg, 2008). In September 2001, Salman Jariri from Iran wrote the 
first post of a weblog in Persian. In November 2001, Hossein Derakhshan,
3
 nicknamed the 
“Blogfather” for spawning Iran’s spectacular blogging revolution, wrote a simple coding system 
in Persian by which many Iranians could create weblogs for themselves. Nowadays, Iranians 
host their blogs using local websites such as Persianblog.ir, Blogfa.com, as well as global sites 
                                                 
3
 In September 2010, after two years of being in prison, Hosein Derakhshan was sentenced to 19 years of prison 
mostly because of his online political and social activities.  
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such as Blogger.com and Wordpress.com. Like all bloggers, Iranian bloggers write about various 
subjects such as daily events, politics, economics, literature, social events, and many others.  
Kelly and Etling (2008) performed a mapping study of Iran’s politics and culture in the 
Persian blogosphere. They indicate that the Persian blogosphere is a large discussion space of 
approximately 60,000 routinely updated blogs featuring a rich and varied mix of bloggers. In a 
more recent study, Omid Ali Masoudi (2011) explains that, based on statistics, there are two 
million weblogs registered in Iran among which only 400,000 are active. About 40,000 weblogs 
have introduced themselves as religious weblogs and have published religious-related material.   
Kelly and Etling (2008) find that the Iranian blogosphere contains four major network 
poles based on the subject of the published posts. These include: secular/reformists, 
conservative/religious, Persian poetry and literature, and mixed subjects. However, they mention 
that according to a popular trope, ‘everything is political’ in Iran. There has always been an 
endless struggle between religious and secular ideologies in Iranian everyday life. Discussions 
on numerous social issues, such as ethics, women’s clothing (hijab), freedom of the press and 
media, popular music, temporary marriage, power and government, revolutionary values, the 
Iran-Iraq war and its consequences, elections, and religio-political duty to support the Islamic 
regime, have freely continued in the Persian blogosphere. While common sense would suggest 
that the Internet and specifically weblogs are the place for reformist and intellectual expressions, 
it should also be noted that it is a place for conservative and fundamentalist ideologies. As Kelly 
and Eliting (2008) write, “the Iranian blogosphere is full of advocates on all sides” (p. 10).       
For this thesis five Persian language weblogs have been studied: Tourjan, Menbar, 
Sibestan, Gol-dokhtar, and Raaze Sar be Mohr. All of them are published in Iran except for 
Sibestan which is published in Europe. Tourjan, Raaze Sar be Mohr, and Sibestan are 
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categorised as reformist weblogs, while Menbar and Gol-dokhtar are considered conservative-
traditional. Tourjan, Menbar, and Gol-dokhtar are known as religious weblogs, but Raaze Sar be 
Mohr and Sibestan are known as social weblogs that publish religious-based issues. The primary 
reason for choosing these weblogs is that the subject of religion is the main issue discussed. All 
of them have a large and broad audience and have published frequently without any notable 
gaps, showing that blogging is taken seriously.    
 
http://www.tourjan.com/ 
 The first weblog that is studied in this thesis is Tourjan.com. This weblog has two 
authors, Ali-Ashraf Fathi and Morteza Abtahi. They present themselves as students of Islamic 
studies in the main religious seminary in Qom
4
, Hawzeh Elmieh (Feizieh), one of the biggest and 
best known Shiite seminaries (madrasas). They are Shiite Muslims who support the modernist-
reformist movement of Iran. Ali is also a Master’s student in the “history of Islam” at Shahid 
Beheshti University in Tehran. He was imprisoned for several months after the presidential 
election of 2009 because of his blog posts and political activities.  
Their weblog is written in Farsi and has about 2000 views per day; it is among the most 
popular weblogs in Farsi. The name of the blog, Tourjan, comes from the name of a city in which 
Ali’s father was killed during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988). By using this name, they want to 
acknowledge Ali’s father and other shaheed or “witnesses” of the war between Iran and Iraq, 
which happened during the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini. Shaheed (Shohada: plural) is a 
religious term in Islam that is used as an honourific term for Muslims who have laid down their 
                                                 
4
 The City of Qom is among the top five important cities for Shiites because of the famous seminaries, famous 
religious scholars and leaders who live in the city, and also because of the holy shrine of Fatemeh al-Masoumeh, the 
daughter of the seventh Imam.  
15 
 




 These bloggers do not blog anonymously. Rather, they introduce themselves with their 
pictures and their complete names. As students in Qom, these bloggers write about their lives, 
their studies, their teachers, who are among the great religious scholars, and the socio-political 
issues of Iranian society and Qom’s seminaries. The blog posts are based on historical analyses, 
interviews, magazine-style of reporting, and also personal commentaries. Finally, the subjects of 
the weblog posts are categorized using the following headings: society, Imam Khomeini and 
religious intellectuals, thoughts (andishe), hawza, self-expression, religion, politics, humour, 
pictures, culture and art, and Ghila. Ghila, meaning “as it is said” is an online magazine within 
the weblog published monthly reporting news related to the seminary (hawza). 
 
http://menbar.ir 
The second weblog is Menbar.ir, which belongs to another religious scholar who has also 
disclosed his real identity. The picture of the author, Ahmad Najmi, shows him wearing a turban, 
illustrating that he is at a level of his study that he can appear in a Muslim scholar’s dress. He 
lives in Qom and is an active blogger. He runs two other online digital magazines and wrote 
several articles in his area of research: the construction of Qom’s hawza and its theorists. He is a 
neo-fundamentalist who wrote several posts in support of the doctrine of wilayat al-faqih to 
support Ayatollah Khamenei, the Supreme leader of Iran, in particular. However, he published 
                                                 
5
 The root of this belief is in the Quran, such as verses 111, chapter 9, which says: “Allah hath purchased of the 
believers their persons and their goods; for theirs (in return) is the garden (of Paradise): they fight in His cause, and 
slay and are slain: a promise binding on Him in truth, through the Law, the Gospel, and the Qur'an: and who is more 
faithful to his covenant than Allah? then rejoice in the bargain which ye have concluded: that is the achievement 
supreme.”   
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several posts criticising the fundamentalist president Ahmadinejad’s performances as well. 
Najmi’s father is a cleric who is the official Imam for Friday prayers in the city of Khoi. This 
shows that he is continuing his family’s tradition of Shiite religious scholarship.  
Menbar.ir is one of the most professional Persian weblogs in terms of technology and 
design. The posts of the weblog are categorized by these subjects: society, religion, politics, 
media, diary, culture, photo-blog, and uncategorized posts. Weblog posts are based on the 
author’s analyses and experiences in hawza, and are written in the form of personal reflections, 
reports, and letters to well-known people. 
His viewpoints and analyses illustrate the traditional system of hawza and the Islamic 
Republic’s theoretical bases. In comparison, Fathi and Abtahi maintain a critical analysis of the 
traditional system of hawza. Although Menbar and Tourjan provide two different perspectives in 




 The blogger in this case is Mehdi Jami who is a famous professional journalist who lives 
in Amsterdam. He worked with the BBC for several years and also established a Farsi radio 
station, Radio Zamaneh. He is also a documentary filmmaker. Jami is widely known as an 
Iranian intellectual who cares about and studies Iranian politics and religion. He runs several 
news websites and has published many articles and books on social and religious dilemmas in 
contemporary Iranian society. Conservative and fundamentalist journalists in Iran have labelled 
him an enemy’s ally and a non-religious person. However, even the name of his weblog, 
Sibestan (apple garden), contains a religious metaphor. As he wrote in the fourth post of the 
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weblog, apple (sib) refers to the story of Adam and Eve who were seduced by the apple tree. The 
weblog dates back to May 2003 and it is one of the weblogs from the Malakut Realm.
6
 Jami 
labels his posts based on 44 titles, such as: We and America; Iranian identity; elections; Iran; 
Iranology; social matters; religion; the religion of the Islamic Republic; the religion of 
despotism; intellectuals; tradition and modernism; cinema; media; and language.  
 
http://mmoeeni14.blogspot.com/ 
Raaze Sar be Mohr (a concealed secret) is written by Mohammad Moeini, a freelance 
journalist, from Iran. The name of the weblog comes from one of the poems by the most famous 
Persian poet, Hafiz. He started blogging in 2003 and his weblog has been filtered several times; 
making this his 14
th
 weblog. The previous ones are no longer accessible from inside Iran for 
those without any anti-filter software. He publishes this weblog using his real name and labels 
his posts with  such headings as: international policy, justice and injustice, democracy, the 
revolution, history, the parliament, people, freedom, media, censorship, environment, ethics, art, 
Ahmadinejd and many other subjects. He does not declare that he is religious, however there are 
many posts that reveal he is a moderate Shiite. He has also worked for several reformist-
modernist newspapers, which explains his political viewpoint. There is a small window on the 
right side of the weblog showing thousands of pictures from the Green Movement, the protestors 
and the reformist political leaders. His own picture is also on the weblog. He lives in Bandar 
Abbas, one of the southern cities of Iran.  
 
                                                 
6
 The Realm of Malakut contains a group of about 43 intellectual weblogs, most of which are published outside of 
Iran. It contains weblogs about various topics in humanities and social sciences. The bloggers are friends and they 
are well known in the offline world. The Malakut Realm was created in 2003 in order to criticise and understand 




Gol-dokhtar (literally: "gol" meaning "flower" and "dokhtar" meaning "girl") is 
published by six women living in Qom. They are religious scholars at hawza Jame’at al-Zahra. 
Most of them are also students in various universities in Iran. They do not blog under their real 
names but their identities are not hard to recognize simply by referring to the links in the side bar 
of the weblog. In addition to Gol-dokhtar, they also publish an online journal, Charghad (scarf), 
which is mostly about the issues affecting the everyday life of Muslim women. The bloggers of 
this weblog are also among active writers in other online religious websites publishing from 
Qom. Their political viewpoint is fundamentalist-conservative and they believe president 
Ahmadinejd creates better opportunities for women, especially religious ones, to be heard. They 
have published many posts under the titles of: hijab; stereotyped women; women and war; 
women and media; marriage and family; recreation, sport, and health; children’s education, 
reports, politics, and some other subjects.       
All the posts of these five weblogs from June, 2009 to June, 2010 have been studied for 
this thesis, which amounts to more than two hundred posts. This time period was chosen for at 
least two reasons. First, the Internet, including blogs, have played a key role in providing a 
relatively free space for criticizing the society and the government, and for arranging gatherings 
and protests after the controversial Iranian presidential election in 2009. Second, the 
confrontation of the state with protesters, and a series of aggressive attacks against and the 
imprisonment of reformist leaders and their supporters, motivated people to criticise the religious 
structure of the state, specifically the wilayat al-faqih institution. Choosing from both pro-
fundamentalists and pro-reformists, both inside and outside Iran, will help us to focus on how 
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religious authority is being captured in Persian weblogs and what kind of impact the technology 
of the Internet is having on Iranian society, and vice versa.  
All the block quotes and direct quotations in this analysis are the author’s free translation, 
from Farsi to English, of blog postings.   
 




Political party Religious view 
Tourjan Reformist Traditionally religious 
Menbar Fundamentalist Traditionally religious 
Raaze Sar be Mohr Reformist Moderately religious 
Gol-dokhtar Fundamentalist Traditionally religious 











Chapter 2: Religious authority  
Defining Authority 
Authority is one of the most complex concepts in sociology. Many sociologists, 
philosophers, political scientists, and historians have tried to explain authority within their own 
field of interest. In general, authority is understood as a moral power that is necessary for any 
group to perdure for any length of time in attaining certain goals (Adelmann, 1974). The general 
definition of authority that is commonly used in different texts considers authority as a term that 
is directly related to “power” and its relationships (Aycock, 1995; Campbell, 2007; Denegri-
Knott, 2004). To establish a clear definition of authority based on its specific context, thinkers 
define authority by its characteristics. For instance, Peter Starr’s definition considers authority as 
“a power to define and describe reality” (as cited in Campbell, 2007, p. 1045), and emphasizes 
the cultural features of authority. Other thinkers, such as Ralf Dahrendorf (1959),  who 
highlighted the role of individuals to define an authoritative position in a social structure of a 
group, are more interested in an understanding of authority that “involves referring to a specific 
role … or a specific individual/entity and his/her position of power” (Campbell, 2007, p. 1045).  
Political scientists such as Antonio Gramsci, Hanna Arendt, and lately Joseph Raz and 
Christopher McMahon (1994) define authority as a “normative power, consisting of the ability to 
change behaviour by providing other overriding reasons for action legitimized by a sufficient 
number of people” (Miller, 2008, p. 8). In their view, the meaning of authority hinges on 
political power. They put emphasis on the power of government and usually analyze authority as 
a reciprocal relationship between political leaders and the common people in a society.  
Philosophers and historians such as Michel Foucault, Mikhail Bakhtin, and recently 
Bruce Lincoln define authority as a part of discourse, and they are more interested in its labile 
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dynamics than its institutional incarnations. In this sense, authority results from the conjunction 
of a speaker, a speech, the staging, time, place of the interaction, and an audience willing to 
respect the speaker (Lincoln, 1994). In this analysis, the frequently imagined distinction between 
the authority of those who are “in authority” versus those who are “an authority” is transcended 
by the emphasis on the discursive: both “have the capacity to produce consequential speech, 
quelling doubts and winning the trust of the audiences whom they engage” (Lincoln, 1994, p. 4). 
Sociologists examine authority both in terms of institutional embodiment and labile 
dynamics. The study of the meaning and characteristics of authority in sociology began with 
Max Weber who was one of the first writers to talk about domination, legitimacy, authority, and 
different types of embodiment of an authoritative system.  
 
Sociological Views on Authority  
Weber begins with the meaning of domination, which is defined as “the probability that 
certain specific commands (or all commands) will be obeyed by a given group of persons” 
(Weber, 1968, p. 212). He notes that “every genuine form of domination implies a minimum of 
voluntary compliance, that is, an interest (based on ulterior motives or genuine acceptance) in 
obedience” (Weber, 1968, p. 212). This definition of dominance is very broad; it could include 
parent-child relationships, employer-employee relationships, teacher-student relationships, forms 
of political rule, and the relation between a religious leader and his/her followers. This definition 
of domination also eliminates those types of power that are based on unveiled force, because 
force may not lead to acceptance of the dominant group or voluntary compliance with its orders. 
Situations of overt conflict and force are also relatively unusual.  
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The broad nature of his definition of domination is the reason why, after Weber, other 
thinkers struggled to find new ways to characterize authority that can cover all forms of 
authoritative relationships and be applied in different eras with different structures of power. 
Weber (1968) defines authority as legitimate forms of domination, that is, forms of domination 
that followers or subordinates consider to be acceptable. Being legitimate does not necessarily 
imply any sense of rationality, right, or natural justice. Rather, domination is legitimate when the 
subordinate accepts, obeys, and considers domination to be desirable, valid, and not worth 
challenging. It is not so much the actions of the dominant party that creates this, but rather the 
willingness of those who are subordinate to believe in the legitimacy of the claims of the 
dominant. 
Weber also outlines three major types of legitimate domination: traditional authority, 
charismatic authority, and legal- rational authority. These three forms do not constitute the 
totality of types of authority, besides, they identify pure types of authority; according to Lewis 
Coser (1977) “[Weber] was aware that in empirical reality mixtures will be found in the 
legitimation of authority” (p. 227). However, they show how it is possible for some people to 
exercise power over others. Also, based on this categorization Weber refers to the conditions 
under which people come to accept the domination as a regular and structured phenomenon. He 
notes that long established social forms and structures become customs that can emerge within a 
group or society on the basis of continued interaction, and require little or no enforcement by any 
specific group. Also, a stronger degree of conformity in a society, as Weber (1968) writes, is 
convention, where the compliance is not just voluntary or customary, but where some sort of 
sanctions may exist for those who do not comply with convention. These may be informal 
sanctions, leading to mild disapproval, or they may be strong sanctions associated with discipline 
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or exclusion (Weber, 1968). Where adopted by an individual or a group that has the legitimate 
capacity and duty to impose sanctions, the convention can become law. This creates a legal order 
where a group assumes the task of applying sanctions to punish transgressions. Where this is 
applied over a territorial unit, a political order can be created through the threat and application 
of physical force by an administrative staff with legal, administrative, military, or police 
functions.  
 
Different Types of Authority 
Weber (1968) believes that, depending on the type of obedience, the kind of 
administrative staff developed to guarantee it, and the mode of exercising authority, 
fundamentally different types of authority will appear in society. As indicated already, he thinks 
the validity of authority may be based on three main grounds (Weber, 1968, p. 15-16):    
1- Rational grounds: where authority rests on a belief in the legality of enacted rules and 
the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands, known as 
legal authority. 
2- Traditional grounds: where authority rests on an established belief in the sanctity of 
immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority under them, 
known as traditional authority. 
3- Charismatic grounds: where authority rests on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, 
heroism, or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative 
patterns or order revealed or ordained by him, known as charismatic authority.  
Legal-rational authority is a type of authority that is based on the legality of patterns of 
standard rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands. 
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Authority is held by legally established impersonal orders and extends to people only by virtue 
of the offices they hold. Legal-rational authority may be challenged by a minority, but this 
challenge would not result in any changes within a small period of time.  
Traditional authority is authority in which the legitimacy is based around custom. 
Legitimacy and power to control are handed down from the past and can be exercised in quite 
dictatorial ways. This is a type of authority in which the traditional rights of a powerful and 
dominant individual or group are accepted, or at least not challenged, by subordinate individuals. 
According to Weber (1968), traditional authority is an apparatus by which inequality is created 
and preserved. If no one challenges the authority of the traditional leader or group, they are likely 
to remain dominant. Also, for Weber, traditional authority blocks the development of legal-
rational forms of authority. 
Charismatic authority exists when the control of others is based on an individual’s 
personal characteristics, such as extraordinary ethical behaviour, heroism, or religious virtuosity. 
Charismatic leaders are obeyed because people feel a strong emotional bond to them. This type 
of authority is different from rational or traditional forms; it develops not from established orders 
or traditions, rather from the special trust the charismatic leaders induce in their followers, the 
peculiar powers they exhibit, and the unique qualities they possess (Weber, 1968). Whether such 
powers actually exist is irrelevant; the fact that followers believe they exist is what is important. 
Weber also considers charisma to be a driving and creative force that surges through traditional 
authority and established rules. The sole basis of charismatic authority is the recognition or 
acceptance of the claims of the leader by the followers. Charismatic authority can be 
revolutionary in nature, challenging traditional and sometimes legal-rational authority. However, 
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this type of authority could also easily degenerate into traditional authority, in which power is 
exercised by those who surround the charismatic leader or into legal-rational forms.  
As Dawson (2011, p. 7) mentions, although Weber (1968) applies his description of 
charisma in a secular context, “charisma referred originally to a divine gift” and “in human 
history most charismatic leaders have been deemed semi-divine, and in its purest form charisma 
is a magical-religious notion.” Thus, it is more likely for charismatic forms of authority to 
emerge based on religious beliefs, although religious authority is not tied to any particular form 
of authority. Religious authority entails a specific type of legitimization that can be presented in 
any of traditional, charismatic, or even legal-rational forms of authority, because these pure 
forms of authority exist only in the abstract. As Weber (1968, p. 246) realized, “[charismatic 
authority] cannot remain stable, but becomes either traditionalized or rationalized, or a 
combination of both” through the process of routinization. This process makes it possible for 
religious authority to become legitimated even in legal-rational ways. In other words, religious 
authority can emerge as a charismatic form of authority, but continue as a legal-rational form. As 
an example, both during and after the 1979 revolution, Iran experienced a movement that tried to 
legalize religious dogma based on the Shiite’s legacy of the Imams.
7
 The Iranian government has 
tried to establish a republican constitution, while being religious and keeping the position and 





                                                 
7
 The concept of “wilayat al-faqih” (the rule of the jurist) was coined by a group of ulama after the Iranian 
revolution, and is based on the charismatic authority of the Imams in Shiite beliefs.    
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Religious Authority in Shiite History and Contemporary Iran 
Quranic Bases of Authority  
Searching for the roots of charismatic authority in Shiite dogma leads us to the text of the 
Quran as it is the main source of religious knowledge in Islam.
8
 Verse 26 from chapter 3 says:  
[O prophet] say [to people]: O Allah! Lord of all dominion! You give dominion to 
whom You will, and take away dominion from whom You will, and You exalt whom 
You will, and abase whom You will. In Your Hand is all good. Surely You are All-
Powerful. 
 
This verse directly reveals that Allah is the ultimate power and He gives authority to whom He 
will, which means that according to Islam, authority has a supernatural-divine source. 
Many verses in different chapters of the Quran also talk about prophecy and authority of 
the Prophet Muhammad. For instance, Chapter 4, verse 59 of the Quran says:  
Believers! Obey Allah and obey the Messenger, and those from among you who are 
invested with authority; and then if you were to dispute among yourselves about anything 
refer it to Allah and the Messenger if you indeed believe in Allah and the Last Day; that 
is better and more commendable in the end.  
 
This verse also refers to Allah as the ultimate source of authority but it legitimizes the authority 
of the Prophet
9
 and “those from among you who are invested with authority” as well. According 
                                                 
8
 A search by the keyword “authority” of the English translation of the Quran by Yusuf Ali gives us 56 items. Since 
many scholars translate the Quran from Arabic to English, searching in different translations may result in a 
different number of items. In other translations we can find the phrase “qualified leaders” being used 
interchangeably with “authority”. Therefore, the number of the items cannot be strictly determined. However, what 
is important here is that within all the verses commenting on the notion of authority in the Quran, the source of 
power and leadership is specified to Allah (God), the Prophet Muhammad (the Messenger) and particular Muslims 
who are invested with authority by Allah and the Prophet. 
9
 There are also other verses with the similar content, such as verse 40, chapter 33: “Muhammad is not the father of 
any of your men, but (he is) the Messenger of Allah, and the Seal of the Prophets: and Allah has full knowledge of 
all things.” Also chapter 47 (called “Muhammad”) verse 2 says: “But those who believe and work deeds of 
righteousness, and believe in the (Revelation) sent down to Muhammad - for it is the Truth from their Lord, He will 
remove from them their ills and improve their condition.” 
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to Shiite beliefs, this authority belongs only to Allah and, with His permission, the Prophet 
Muhammad and the Imams.
10
  
Imam is the title given to a person who takes the lead in a community in a particular 
social, political, scientific, or religious form of ideology and thought (Motahhari, 2005; 
Tabataba’i, 1960). Shiism believes that Islamic society is in need of supervision in three areas of 
religious concern: 1- government, 2- science, and 3- guidance in the spiritual life. In this 
perspective, the person who occupies the function of giving that guidance is the leader of the 
community who must be appointed by God and the Prophet (Tabataba’i, 1975). 
According to Shiite beliefs, the Imams represent God’s presence among mankind. There 
have been twelve Imams since the Prophet Muhammad. They are seen as the Imams of guidance 
and justice, and that God guides people through them; they are the leaders of humankind in their 
life and religion. It is believed that the Imams inherited the Prophet’s extraordinary qualities, 
including his divine knowledge, and this grants them charisma, according to Shiite sources.
11
 As 
Takim (2006) states: “since the purpose of the [I]mamate is to perpetuate the Prophet’s 
charismatic authority and guide humankind, a corollary to the principle of hereditary charisma is 
that the [I]mams partake in the peculiar extraordinary traits hitherto reserved for the prophets” 
(p. 26).  Therefore, for the Shiites, “those who are invested with authority”, in verse 59 in chapter 
                                                 
10
 Shiism has studied and investigated the primordial nature of man and the continuous tradition of wisdom that has 
survived among men. It has penetrated into the principle purpose of Islam which is to revivify man’s primordial 
nature, and has investigated such things as the methods used by the Prophet in guiding the community; the troubles 
which entangled Islam and the Muslims and which led to division and separation; and the short life of the Muslim 
governments of the early centuries, which were characterized by negligence and lack of strict religious principles. 
As a result of these studies Shiism has reached the conclusion that there are sufficient traditional texts left by the 
Prophet to indicate the procedure for determining the Imam and successor of the Prophet. This conclusion is 
supported by Quranic verses and ahadith of Ghadir, Safinah, Thaqalayn, Haqq, Manzilah, Da’wat-i ’ashirah-i 
aqrabin and others. But of course these ahadith, most of which are also accepted by Sunnism, have not been 
understood in the same way by Shiism and Sunnism (Rabbani Golpayegani, 2003; Tabataba’i, 1975).   
11
 See Appendix.  
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4 of the Quran, could be no other than the Imams.
12
 Similar to other charismatic leaders, Shiite 
Imams were the religious and social locus of power and had an intimate connection with their 
disciples which are the main two characteristics that Weber mentions for a charismatic figure 
(Dawson, 2011).      
What distinguishes Shiite and Sunni is their belief about the successors of the Prophet. 
According to Shiite dogma “Muhammad’s personal charisma, which he received from God, is 
transmitted genealogically only in his family traditions” (Waida, 1986, p. 5). However, Sunnis 
believe in the legitimacy of the four great Caliphs
13
 who led society after the Prophet died. 
Shiites reject the source of authority for Caliphs and believe that Ali – Muhammad’s cousin 
and son-in-law – is the true Imam
14
 after the Prophet and that Imamate (the authority of the 
Imams) continues in his family alone. They always considered the Caliphate to be far from 
the sacred authority of their Imams (Motaharri, 1989; Tabataba’i, 1975). As Hussein Nasr 
(1975) mentions:  
The distinctive institution of Shi’ism is the Imamate and the question of the Imamate is 
inseparable from that of walayat, or the esoteric function of interpreting the inner 
mysteries of the Holy Quran and the Shari’ah. According to the Shi’ite view the 
successor of the Prophet of Islam must be one who not only rules over the community in 
justice but also is able to interpret the Divine Law and its esoteric meaning. Hence he 
must be free from error and sin (ma’sum) and he must be chosen from on high by divine 
decree (nass) through the Prophet (p. 10).  
 
                                                 
12
 According to Shiite interpretation (tafseer) of this verse, ‘those in authority’ must refer to the individuals from the 
ummah who are preserved from error and sin in their actions and saying [ma’sum]; refer to Appendix. 
13
 Three Caliphs: Abubaker, Omar, and Othman, were among the famous disciples of the prophet and Ali, the fourth 
Caliph, is the first Shiite Imam.  
14
 “The very life of Ali [the first Imam] and his actions show that he accepted the previous caliphs as understood in 
the Sunni sense of khalifah (the ruler and the administrator of the Shari’ah), but confined the function of walayat, 
after the Prophet, to himself. That is why it is perfectly possible to respect him as a caliph in the Sunni sense and as 
an Imam in the Shi’ite sense, each in its own perspective” (Nasr in Tabataba’i, 1975, p. 11). 
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Therefore, authority in twelve Imami Shiite
15
 can be categorized specifically as 
hereditary charisma, in which “charisma is a quality transmitted by the heredity; thus it is 
participated in by the kinsmen of its bearer, particularly by his closest relatives” (Weber, 1968, p. 
248). According to Weber (1968) when charisma is inherited, the charisma of the leader is 
perpetuated down a particular line. This is certainly the case in Shiite history in which the Imams 
had “the authority of the extraordinary and personal gift of grace (charisma), the absolutely 
personal devotion and personal confidence in revelation, heroism, or other qualities of individual 
leadership” (Weber, 1958, as cited in Takim, 2006, p. 24). 
However, except for five years in the life of Ali and six months in the life of Hasan (the 
first and the second Imam), none of these Imams were in charge politically. Instead Sunni 
Caliphs ruled the majority of Islamic society. In the first Islamic dynasty (the Umayyad) and the 
second one (the Abbasid), the Caliphs paid much attention to the social and religious activities of 
the Imams and restricted their social activities. 
The Imams experienced restrictions in their relationships with people, since they held all 
the attributes that charismatic leader are supposed to hold; specifically they tended to be 
energetic people and displayed a consistent faith in the fulfillment of their mission. The Imams 
were the object of devotion since they were believed to represent the correct way of living; they 
were believed to be the criterion for distinguishing wrong and right based on the purest form of 
Islamic ideology. Shiite Imams were believed to have extraordinary and uncanny powers.  
                                                 
15
 Twelve Imami Shiites are those Muslims who follow twelve Imams, who were all from the Prophet’s family, his 
son in law and his grand children, after the Prophet. Moreover, the two main sects in Islam, Shiites and Sunnis have 
major differences in how they define the principles of religion. There are five principles (usul al-din) as stated by 
Shiism, including: 1- tawhid or belief in Divine Unity; 2- nubuwwah or prophecy; 3- ma’ad or resurrection; 4- 
imamah or the Imamate, belief in the Imams as successors of the Prophet; and 5- ’adl or Divine Justice. In the three 
basic principles-Unity, prophecy, and resurrection Sunnism and Shiism agree, but in the other two they differ. 
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Another related point here is, Shiites, on the basis of several ahadith,
16
 believe the twelfth 
Imam is not really absent from the earth but is alive and merely hidden from the eyes of 
mankind.
17
 The Occultation began in 939, and it is believed that it will continue as long as God 
wills.
18
 As Liyakat Takim (2006) explains, “Shi’ism posited a distinctive charismatic lineage of 
redemptive figures who offered salvation to the faithful. This is because soteriology, as 
envisaged in Shi’ism, was contingent on the recognition of and loyalty to the [I]mams in general 
and to the imam of the time in particular” (p. 26). 
Two main points can be concluded from this history. The first is that the Shiite Imams 
were always able to influence society because of their divine charismatic authority. The second 
is that Shiites always believed in the authority of Imams and their roles as supreme political 
leaders and teachers of religion. This means that Shiites always differentiated the political 
authority of the Sunni Caliphs from the charismatic political religious authority of the Imams. 
Moreover, Shiism is categorized as a messianic sect that expects the Savoir, the twelfth Imam. 
                                                 
16
 Hadith (plural: ahadith) a text based authority, second only to the Quran, which is a record of the words and 
deeds of the Prophet. Hadith frames the normative view of Shiism that guides Shiites in their religious practices. 
Hadith, as a form of practical guidance, explain the deeds and words of the prophet, which are considered divine, 
connecting the disciples with the Imams, and with each other. It creates a unity in religious practices of everyday life 
for all Shiites. Furthermore, hadith helps to cultivate certain images about the Imams and their opponents (Takim, 
2006). 
17
 He is the son of the eleventh Imam and was born in Iraq (Samarrah) in 868 and until 872 when his father was 
martyred, lived under his father’s care and tutelage (Amir-Ebrahimi, 2009; Tabataba’i, 1975). He was hidden from 
public view and only a few of the elite among the Shiites were able to meet him. After the martyrdom of his father 
he became Imam and by divine command went into Occultation (ghaybat). 
18
 The occultation of the twelfth Imam is divided into two parts: the first, the minor occultation (ghaybat-i sughra) 
which began in 872 and ended in 939, lasting about seventy years (Ashuri, 2004; Montazer Ghaem, 2001; Savory, 
1974); the second is the major one. In the minor occultation, he appeared only to his four deputies (na’ib) and even 
then only in exceptional circumstances. After the death of the last deputy in 939, the special deputation of the Imam 
came to an end (Ashuri, 2004; Montazer Ghaem, 2001; Savory, 1974) and the major occultation (ghaybat-i kubra) 
began (Motaharri, 1989; Tabataba’i, 1975).  
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This perspective drives the Shiite communities to establishment a Shiite state in preparation for 
the appearance of the twelfth Imam.
19
     
 
Authority and Leadership after the Imams 
After the Occultation of the Twelfth Imam, based on one of the most famous saying of 
the Prophet: “the scholars are heirs of the Prophets” (Crone and Hinds, 1986, p. 81), the ulama 
became the heirs of the Imams. Because of their legal learning and their knowledge of the Quran 
and the traditions of the Prophet, their legal injunctions were to be obeyed, as Amir Arjomand 
(1988) writes. This means that the Imams’ power (both religious and political) was attributed to 
the ulama, since they were revered as the most reliable sources for religious knowledge. From 
the eleven century onward, great ulama were raised who inherited not only the knowledge but 
also the authority of the Prophet as the guardians of the community; this tradition further enabled 
people to refer to them by the title of Imams (Takim, 2006).
20
  
Among the precious Shiite ulama Allama al-Hilli was the one who accepted the 
suggested concept of ijtihad
21
 and whose definition of ijtihad is always cited in Shiite works. 
This new concept made Shiite figh
22
 a dynamic knowledge, since it allowed the Shiite jurists to 
drive new legal norms legitimately base on the holy text of Quran and Ahadith (Madelung, 
1982). ijtihad was followed by another related concept, taqlid (imitation). This concept led to the 
rise of a new class of ulama, called mujtahid (the scholar who is the source of immitations), who 
                                                 
19
 Since the Shiites believe that the appearance of the twelfth Imam will happen under specific social, political, and 
religious conditions, all members of the society are responsible for practicing religion correctly and they must pray 
to make his appearance possible.      
20
 Such as Imam al-Ghazali (Sunni/Sufi) and Imam Fakhr al-Razi (Sunni) both in 12
th
 century; and Imam Khomeini 




 The endeavour of a top ranked Muslim scholar (mujtahid) to derive a rule of divine law from the Quran and 
hadith.  
22
 Islamic jurisprudence.   
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have the ability to interpret, define, and articulate the law, as well as the authority to issue 
fatawa.
23
 Therefore, each Shiite Muslim is supposed to choose a well-known mujtahid to follow 
his fatawa. The difference between the authority of the Imams and mujtahids is in the notion that 
the Imams are believed to be the infallible (ma’soum) heirs of the Prophet whose knowledge is 
delivered from God, while the mujtahids obtain their position after a very long education and 
they are not infallible.      
Many believe that during the Safavid period in Iran, not only were Shiite’s political 
viewpoints being theorized by the ulama, but the commands of kings and political leaders were 
also being authorized as religious tenets. This means that the commands made by the ruler of a 
Shiite state were given equal value to religious commands and should be obeyed by all 
citizens/believers.  
If the ulama are the builders of religion after the Prophets, the Kings are the protectors of 
that building. The construction of religion is done by the lords of knowledge (‘ilm) but its 
protection by the lords of command… [and] justice is the pillar of the arcade of 
sovereignty and equity the guarantor of the order of the kingdom. (Qazvini, as cited in 
Amir Arjoman, 1988) 
 
This combination of the duties of the ulama and political leaders illustrates another aspect 
of the evolution of charismatic authority: the routinization of charisma. As we discussed, the 
charisma of the Prophet and his knowledge were inherited by the Imams. Since the Occultation 
the charismatic authority of the ulama, as the heirs of the Imams, had become institutionalized, 
specifically because the political system/rulers (particularly in Iran) needed to legitimize their 
government, they assigned ulama to political positions.  
Weber’s analysis of charismatic authority and his analysis of the forces leading to the 
routinization of this authority provide important tools for analyzing the social changes in the 
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  Fatwa (plural: fatawa) A juristic ruling concerning Islamic law issued by a mujtahid. 
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Shiite community. However, his model of routinization of charisma is too simplistic to explain 
the diverse forces that emerge and the tensions that are generated in Shiite history. As Takim 
(2006) mentions, the Imams tried to institutionalize their authority in their time by establishing 
education systems and sending representatives to the Caliphates to address religious, cultural, 
political and financial dilemmas. Therefore, the process of routinization and rationalization 
began during the life of the Imams and has continued more formally since the occultation and the 
rise of the concept of mujtahid (Takim, 2006). Although they did not replace the Imams, the 
mujtahids gradually became important leaders in Shiite community. This institution combined 
religious and communal leadership, and reflected the unstructured nature of the Shiite 
establishment, which included numerous leaders coexisting with each other (Takim, 2006). Their 
authority evolved not only by transmitting the hadith of the Imams, but also by interpreting them 
in light of current practices and needs. This new feature linked them to the political issues of 
their society even more than before.  
 
Consolidation of Religious Authority with Politics: The Genesis of a Charismatic Leader in 
the contemporary Iran 
From the 18
th
 century, the ulama initiated several oppositional movements in Iran since 
they had emotional bonds with people and had an influential relationship with different classes of 
society. Since that time, the ulama have been identified as one of the most critical forces that can 
give or take the legitimacy of the political system, as Floor (1980) says: “religious leaders, with 
their large legal, social, and educational functions, to a large extent defined the limits of power of 
the ruling class” (p. 501). The ulama were not only religious leaders, they had also been involved 
in the political attitudes of the state, whether directly or indirectly, through either their resistance 
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or support of the political rulers. The oppositional perspective of the ulama during the 18th and 
the 19th centuries in Iran was based on two objections: 1) anti-imperialist oppositions against the 
penetration of Western countries, such as the British Empire and Russia whose ideological 
perspectives (Christianity and later on Marxism) were not acceptable to the majority of the 
Iranian population who were Shiite Muslim; 2) anti-dynasty objections arose due to two main 
factors. First, Shahs tried to acquire more influence where the ulama had held traditional, local, 
and family-based authority for a long time.
24
 Second, in the very beginning stage of the 
secularization, the state tried to increase attempts to restrict the importance of the religious courts 
to cut down the level of state pensions to the ulama (Floot, 1980). 
Under the Pahlavi dynasty (1925 – 1979), Iran became an increasingly modern and 
secular country despite a great segment of the society being religious. This basic contradiction 
between the religious part of the society and government’s secular and pro-West polices created 
tensions in Iranian society. As a historically specific phenomenon, charisma is, as Weber (1986) 
argues, “the product of crisis and enthusiasm” (Bendix, 1977, p. 301). What motivated Ayatollah 
Khomeini and other ulama to rise up against the political system was the non-religious modern 
procedure that had been shaped by the government ignoring the needs and religious culture of 
the great segment of the society.  
In the years of crisis before the revolution of 1979 and in the beginning years, he was the 
leader of a diverse coalition of communist, socialist, Islamic Marxist, constitutionalist, liberal, 
moderately religious, and secular men and women. There is general agreement that the main 
segments of the Iranian society who supported Ayatollah Khomeini were the urban lower class 
                                                 
24
 Although Iran formally had a central government, the Shah’s power normally did not extend beyond the capital 
city. The local elite families were allowed to control and manage their region while they saw the Shah as their 
legitimate ruler; in this regard they were paying taxes to the capital (Floot, 1980).  
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and lower-middle class (Akhavi, 1987; Sanasarian, 1995) because the ideals of social justice and 
equality of Shiite ideology resonated well within their ranks. From the beginning of the 
revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini’s devotees give him the title of Imam, which elevated him to a 
status above ayatollah.
25
 Therefore, his followers wanted to illustrate that he had unique qualities 
of divine power and authority. Also many believed that his influence was not restricted to Iranian 
society, rather his authority had a great impact in other Muslim societies as well.             
No one can doubt that he was a charismatic leader whose impact was felt beyond his 
country and with enormous force throughout the world. Islamic fundamentalist 
movements (Sunni and Shiite) were deeply affected by him, and the Western world, 
caught by surprise, paid heavily in a storm of events that followed the 1979 revolution in 
Iran (Sanasarina, 1995, p. 190). 
 
While he was alive, revolutionary zeal was kept alive by creating new institutions in a 
new organizational apparatus. New organizations that were directly influenced by the 
fundamentalist interpretation of religious laws and ideology followed the orders and main goals 
of Ayatollah Khomeini. This resulted in the destruction of any remnants of the monarchy and its 
replacement with his vision of an Islamic regime (Sanasarian, 1995). All of the previous 
organizations and government ministries, including the justice and education systems, were 
subjected to an ideological cleansing process. Clerics penetrated the bureaucracy and were 
placed in various ministries.   
As Weber writes “charisma cannot remain stable, but becomes either traditionalized or 
rationalized or combination of both” (Weber, 1968, p.246). By writing the Constitution of the 
Islamic Republic based on the critical concept of “wilatay al-faqih”,
26
 new political system of 
                                                 
25
 As mentioned previously, in the Shiite tradition the title of Imam refers to the twelve divine successors of the 
Prophet.   
26
 “Wilayat al-faqih” (Persian: velayat-e faghih) has been variously translated as “rule of the jurisconsult,” 
“guardianship of the jurist,” “mandate of the jurist,” “trusteeship of the jurist,” “the discretionary authority of the 
jurist,” and “governance of the jurist”. Wilayat (authority) is an important feature of Islamic jurisprudence, as well 
as Islamic philosophy. Allah is the “original incumbent” of wilayat, and the prophet acquires it by devolution. 
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Iran was considered to become rationalized based on the traditional Shiite perspective. This was 
while the social and political system was being institutionalized and rationalised as an element of 
the transformation into a “republic” regime. “Wilayat al-faqih” is considered to be the deputy of 
the infallible Prophet and the Imams. Wally al-faqih (the person who is in the position of wilayat 
al-faqih) is not only the sole leading mujtahid, he also heads the political system. As Ayatollah 
Khomeini writes “the jurist-ruler will possess the same authority as the most noble messenger 
(upon whom be peace and blessings) in the administration of society, and it will be the duty of 
all people to obey him” (Khomeini, 1981, p. 62). All other official and unofficial organizations 
in the society should therefore perform under his command, although Ayatollah Khomeini 
divided power into three sections (presidency, juridical, and parliamentary) to rule society 
professionally.  
Religious authority has continued on after Ayatollah Khomeini, however, the second 
leader, Ayatollah Khamenei’s (from 1989) charismatic power is not nearly equal to that of 
Ayatollah Khomeinei’s. The second leader was elected by Majlis-e Khobregan (the Assembly of 
Experts),
27
 however, his authority cannot be identified as purely legal-rational or traditional since 
he is a mujtahid who holds some qualities of charismatic characteristics. Under his leadership, a 
more exaggerated style of the fundamentalist Shiite traditions has been running in the society. 
Also, the repeated allusions of “the enemy” – the United States and other Western states – plays 
a key role in Khamenei’s speeches which influences all the local and international policies of the 
Islamic republic of Iran.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Sunnis believe that wilayat then devolves from the Prophet upon the Caliphs, while the Shiites reject this view and 
maintain that it inheres, instead, in the Imams. There are some mujtahids, among them Ayatollah Khomeini who 
believe in the notion that jurists would acquire the quality of substantive or “original” wilayat from the Imams. 
Therefore the person who runs the position has relatively the same authority as what the Imams had (Akhavi, 1996). 
27
 Council/Assembly of Experts is a deliberative body of 86 mujtahids who are charged with electing and removing 
the supreme leader of Iran and supervising his activities.  
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 During his leadership, the society fragmented in two main political segments: modernist-
reformists and fundamentalist-conservatives. The reformist group believes in political and 
cultural freedom, more open debates in the press, and changing the language and style of Iranian 
politics. This perspective has generated a wave of intellectual, literary and political activism that 
has since become a fixture of Iranian society and politics. As Nasr (2005) mentions, by 1998 Iran 
had 740 newspapers, some with a daily circulation in excess of 100,000 readers. Today there are 
an estimated 60,000 Iranian Weblogs, which has made Persian the third most widely used 
language on the Internet, after English and Mandarin Chinese. There are also thousands of 
student publications, some of which are influential news outlets. All of these deeply affected the 
authoritative power of the fundamentalist-conservatives in Iranian society, which means that 
different layers of religious authority have been subjected to different interpretations. Ayatollah 
Khatami, the reformist president, has become a symbol of a moderate cleric who emphasises the 
role of the “public” and “intellectuals” in running society rather than the personal authority of the 
supreme leader. The reformist movement challenged different layers of religious and political 
structure and authority in the society but it remained ineffective and did not have much chance of 
reaching the cherished reformist goals (Nasr, 2005).  
The conservative consolidation of power left Khatami’s presidency restricted and the 
supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, came to play an increasingly active role in social matters, 
exerting more direct control and authority over state organs such as the parliament and 
government (Nasr, 2005). After an unexpected win in the presidential election of 2005, 
Ahmadinejd, as the representative of the hard-liners, effectively created a popular base of 
support for conservative rule and the supreme leader. As Kamrava (2010) writes, serious radical 
changes occurred in the tone of politics away from Khatami’s emphasis on dialogue and 
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inclusion towards more of the sloganeering and confrontational rhetoric reminiscent of the 
revolution’s early days. The political, religious, and cultural atmosphere of the society became 
constrained because of a series of extremist orders from the supreme leader, and the government 
and the military organizations of the regime. The reason for all the extreme decisions and orders 
is the ultimate goal of “preserving the system” (hefz-e nezam) at any expense. As a result of this 
extremist viewpoint, freedom in publishing newspapers, books and journals became restricted 
and urban movements such as the students and women’s rights movements were suppressed 
aggressively. 
However, one of the most important developments in Iranian culture and society that has 
affected the religious political atmosphere in recent years has been the increased use of the 
Internet and the explosion of weblogs in the Persian language. This has created a new context in 
which to discuss the Shiite regime, its government and particularly the role of walli al-faqih. 
Weblogs contain arguments about moving toward a more secular society, as well as the 
fundamentalist viewpoints supporting traditional and rigid clerical perspectives. In fact, weblogs 
replaced many of the suppressed newspapers and attracted journalists; university students now 
express both personal and political feelings and exchange ideas as never before. There are more 
than 60,000 Persian weblogs on Blogspot.com (Kelly and Elting, 2008) alone, and they are 
routinely being updated. Although the government filters enormous numbers of weblogs and 
websites, this technology is still the freest mode of expression for religious and political views. 
The presidential election in 2009 and the formation of the Green Movement, as a 
modernist-reformist movement, mark a significant breaking point in the religious political 
history of the Islamic Republic and even in the entire history of Iran. Many people suffered from 
the brutal clampdown after the elections, which directly affected their beliefs and views of the 
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Islamic regime, specifically the unrestricted ability of regulations for the walli al-faqih to 
interfere in the political and social issues of the society. It is obvious that the election has 
changed the nature of the Islamic Republic’s political system and its relationship with Iranians 
politically and socially. The authority of the supreme leader has been questioned and the core 
point of the Constitution has been challenged, and by different classes of the society. This means 
that the election has raised critiques of both the institutional and ideological authority of the 
clerical body (Kamrava, 2010).  
The 2009 Iranian presidential election unveiled several political challenges to the 
religious establishment and conservative politicians. The Green Movement (Wave) believes that 
the hard-liners, supported by Ayatollah Khamenei, tried to remove the “republic” part of “the 
Islamic Republic” and give absolute power to the supreme leader. The signs and slogans they 
used, such as “death to the dictator” were a surprise for the regime and also the inactive segment 
of the society. The supreme leader, who was supposed to lead the society based on the pure 
heritage of the Imams, was accused of being a dictator who should resign or, according to 
people’s statement in the street marches and protests, the regime should move toward secularism, 
ending the institution of wilayat al-faqih. The legitimacy of the religious political system was 
broken after the increased and enlarged silent protests and street marches were met with the 
massive repressive actions, including the use of teargas, arbitrary arrests, torturing of prisoners 
(Afshari, 2009; Kamrava, 2010, Sahliyeh, 2009).        
A significant part of the debate about the legitimacy of the supreme leader and the 
doctrine of wilayat al-faqih is taking place in the blogosphere. Persian bloggers within Iran, as 
well as abroad, bring their support and criticisms into the public arena of the Internet. The notion 
of “anonymity” helps the people argue their thoughts in this regard. Despite the fact that many of 
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the bloggers from inside Iran who revealed their real identity end up in prison because of their 
criticisms, and the filtering regulations that prevent many weblogs and websites from being 
reached legally in Iran, a massive body of discussion and argument can be found in Persian 
weblogs about the presidential election and its aftermath. As Amir-Ebrahimi (2008) writes, 
despite government censorship and self-censorship in blogistan by all kinds of bloggers, 
“[blogistan] has become a place where the hidden half of Iranian society is revealed in a global 
public space” (p. 239). This way, not only the weblogs writing by non-religious or religious 
intellectuals challenge the religious government of Iran, but also, weblog written by traditional 
religious bloggers has become an important challenge for the Islamic Republic. For Instance, 
religious girls, same as secular ones, find a new space to disclose issues about Muslim women. 
This type of issues has never been evoked in physical spaces before the Internet time in Iran. 
Through blogistan “one can learn a lot about the life and opinions of the younger generation, 
from the religious to the secular, for whom limits and borders do not have the same meaning they 
had for their parents and their elders” (Amir-Ebrahimi, 2008, p. 239). 
 
Theorizing Religious Authority on the Internet 
“Modern information technology has changed the social conditions by which political 
and religious authority are produced” (Turner, 2007, p. 117). The free flow of information today 
– whether through the television, print media, or the Internet – cannot be controlled easily, by 
governments, traditional religious leaders, or any other organizations (Bunt, 2000; Castells, 
1996; Turner, 2007). 
The Internet is a device that provides a free flow of information about/and for all new and 
old religions. It also provides a public sphere to talk about and negotiate the concepts and 
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customs in various religions. Since the Internet is a new technology, there are few studies about 
its influence on religious life or the manifestation of religion in cyberspace. There is also little 
research on religious authority in the blogosphere.  
One of the pioneering efforts in this area is the work of Lorne Dawson (2000) who 
discusses the implications of the Internet for religious recruitment, religious conflicts and 
authority, and the mediation of religious experience. He suggests three areas that sociological 
researchers should consider for studying the presentation of religion on the Internet: (1) the 
content of the material that has been published on the Internet; (2) the audience who receives this 
information, and; (3) the effects of the Internet on religion and vice versa, since “almost every 
religion, no matter how small or unusual has a presence on-line” (p. 28).  
Dawson (2000) believes that religion, “as a mode of social life on the Internet” (p. 31), 
can be studied through two main themes: identity and community. With regard to identity, he 
discusses the characteristics of online communication, such as anonymity and fragmented 
identities. These characteristics provide some positive and some negative consequences. For 
example, anonymity, as a positive feature, opens the door to talking about religiously sensitive 
subjects that could not be discussed freely in face-to-face situations. However it contains some 
negative consequences such as creating fake identities to commit crimes. In addition, talking 
about the features of virtual communities, Dawson (2000) mentions that these groups contain 
“boundary-breaking” interactions. This feature also has a great impact on arguing about religious 
issues more openly on the Internet, since real religious communities usually follow strict rules 
and strive to defend the boundaries of their beliefs.              
Dawson (2000) suggests that two major concerns regarding the emergence of the Internet 
and its impacts on religion include the emergence and spread of new cults, as well as issues 
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around religious conflict and authority. He believes that the second concern is more serious 
because the Internet provides a huge body of religious information that costs almost nothing and 
can be accessed for free. This situation conflicts with the authoritative aspects of many religions 
because the Internet constitutes “a prime illustration of one of the most lamented features of the 
cyberspace: the proliferation of misinformation and disinformation” (p. 43).  
One of the studies to look at the consequences of free and open access to religious 
information through the Internet is Bruce Lawrence’s (2002) work, which specifically focused 
on the authority of the Islamic tradition. He introduces authority in Islam as having three aspects: 
scriptural, charismatic, and juridical. It is scriptural because it is based on the holy book of 
Quran; it is charismatic since it is based on the Prophet’s deeds and words through hadith; and it 
is juridical because it contains specific codes and definition of norms and values within the 
Shari’a. Lawrence goes on to discuss Hoover and Venturelli’s (1996) work on geo-political 
diversities and boundaries in Islamic communities, and their identification of three 
complementary vectors of contemporary Islamic religion online: 1- the institutional, meaning 
how cultural associations present Islam in cyberspace; 2- the public, meaning how governments 
put information about Islam online, and; 3- the private, which includes individuals who have 
neither the institutional nor political clout of the other two vectors but are also committed to 
projecting Islam on the Internet. Lawrence’s study monitors and explains the content of some of 
the Islamic websites in each vector and concludes that,  
we should learn to expect the unexpected: digital dreams will have their counterparts in 
digital dramas, and those outcomes no seer will dare predict. This much, however, is 
certain: Muslim cybernauts will be pivotal players in the information revolution: women, 





However, the level of analysis in this article is not complex. Lawrence does not move 
toward analysing the content of these websites and only focuses on introducing them. Also, the 
main question of the study, “the consequences of the new technology on Islam and the notion of 
religious authority”, remains essentially untouched.  
Bryan Turner (2007) studied the challenge this new media poses to religious authority, 
focusing on the different nature of the pedagogical system in the network society. Like Dawson, 
he believes that web-based information systems challenge both the printed-based authority of 
secular governments and the traditional authority of world religions because there cannot be any 
strict control over the content of this new medium.  
Turner also reminds the reader that in Abrahamic religions, knowledge about God is not 
disclosed through rational discussion. Rather, revelation is the basis of knowledge about God. 
This results in the formation of charismatic authority for those people who have received these 
revelations (i.e., the prophets). After the prophets, religious scholars became the religious 
authorities that could interpret and decode religious texts. The emergence of web-based media 
essentially makes every person a translator and interpreter of religious texts, which threatens the 
traditional voices of those scholars because of “the flexibility and volume of this religious traffic 
in information” (p. 118) online.  
Comparing the authoritative system in the Catholic Church, the Jewish community, and 
Islam, Turner focuses on the charismatic essence of authority in Muslim countries. He mentions 
how Islamic charismatic authority became routinized (applying Weber’s analysis of authority, 
1968), explaining that this occurred due to the way in which the Quran was being transmitted 
and transferred among Muslim people. Turner describes the era in which the main way to learn 
the holy Quran was through memorization, the era in which the written format of the text was the 
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main way of spreading religious knowledge, and the current era of web-based information. He 
explains that each of these three formats result in different authoritative relationships. In the 
Internet era, which we are living in, the legitimacy and uniqueness of the source of  interpretation 
breaks down since the Internet provides a ground for every person to increase his/her religious 
knowledge. In the current era, an individual does not necessarily need to memorize the Quran or 
study in a religious college to be eligible to discuss religious issues. Therefore, the Internet has 
put religious/charismatic authority on a different stage entirely.   
Turner (2007) believes that Weber’s classification of authority is unable to explain the 
source of religious authority online. This authority cannot be considered traditional since it has 
arisen in a network society based on “e-democracy”.  In particular, Turner points to two main 
characteristics of the network society as the main factors of “e-democracy”: freedom of access 
and horizontal communication, and the right to unimpeded self-steering (freedom of self). 
Additionally, it cannot be assumed as charismatic because networks cannot be legitimized by 
deeds and words of a single person. Further, it cannot be considered as legal-rational since the 
flow of information is not the product of a hierarchical organization of a set offices issuing 
commands in a linear chain. Rather, “the authority of the Internet is devolved, dispersed, and 
dissipated” (p. 124). Although the current research can use some of the Turner’s points regarding 
religious authority, specifically in terms of the hierarchical authority of the charismatic leaders 
and religious texts, it does not focus on the authority of the Internet, as Turner does. Rather, this 
thesis specifically looks at the interchanges between the Internet and Shiite religious authority. 
There are some criticisms of Turner’s research. For instance, he compares Islamic 
authority with the Papacy in the Catholic Church, as Lawrence (2002) does as well, and he 
claims that Islam does not have a hierarchical system (i.e., in which the mullahs or the Imams are 
45 
 
given authority by a superior). This is not an accurate claim since, at least in the Shiite tradition, 
religious scholars must spend several years studying in madrasa (hawza)
28
 and pass several 
exams. After that, their teachers and the hawza system will approve their eligibility of being 
mujtahids to issue fatawa (plural of fatwa). It is not as hierarchical as the Catholic Church, but it 
is not free of hierarchical ordering either, and this current research is going to analyze how the 
hierarchical system of hawza and charismatic figures are being presented on the Internet.    
Another study by Jon Anderson (2003) focuses on the role of the Internet as a significant 
new medium in expanding the public sphere for religious discussions. In this new environment, 
“Islamic discourse is altered by new positioning and new interpreters” (p. 56). He mainly focuses 
on the role of Muslim Diaspora; young Muslims who study at higher levels of education and 
become professionals – mostly in technology and science fields – in Western countries, and he 
claims that these are Muslims reshaping the public sphere of Islam.       
Both Anderson and Turner refer to the impact of the Internet on the Muslim Diaspora 
which only a small part of this research. However, the results of their studies are related to the 
main questions posed in this thesis, especially with regard to how different layers of religious 
authority are being presented on the Internet. Turner provides an example, referring to the 
tendency of young Muslims overseas to seek information about their religion through the World 
Wide Web, instead of referring to the Imams or other traditional sources of authority. For Turner, 
this is a challenge to the traditional authoritative system of religious education. Related to this, 
Anderson believes that the Internet has extended the power of the middle class Muslim 
professionals who use their skills in computers and other technologies to “cast religious talk in 
                                                 
28
 Hawza is a seminary of traditional Islamic school of higher learning. It is a term used mostly by the Shiite 
Muslims communities to refer to a traditional Shiite centre where clerics are trained. In hawza students are trained 
through a study of classic Islamic texts in their original languages, Arabic.  
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idioms of speech and thought previously or otherwise allocated to separate speech communities, 
forming a continuum instead of a dichotomization between elite and mass, literate and folk” 
(Anderson, 2003, p. 56). Therefore, as Anderson says, Islam on the Internet not only forms a new 
class of interpreters with different opinions and interests, but it also presents “intermediate 
contexts that reflect a more nuanced diversity of views, settings, projects, and expressions of 
Islam today” (p. 57).       
What is unclear in Anderson’s article is why he downplays the role of other Muslim 
professionals in comparison to technical people. In fact, the direct influence of Muslims who 
study in the areas of philosophy, literature, social sciences, and religious studies in shaping 
religious discussions online cannot be understated. Moreover, although it is true that Muslims 
living in Western society have more opportunities to challenge religious authority online because 
of their open access to the Internet, religious intellectuals from inside these Muslim countries 
play a key role in breaking traditional boundaries by arguing about sensitive issues in religious 
debates – especially in cyberspace.   
Another study that discusses the Muslim Diaspora and their usage of the Internet was 
completed by Jan Scholz, Tobias Selge, Max Stille and Johannes Zimmermann (2008). This 
study focuses on how the orientation to this technology has added new interpretations and 
linguistic dimensions to the Muslim world that could challenge traditional authorities. This 
article attempts to analyze how far the use of podcasts by Muslim groups and individuals 
contributes to the emergence of a Muslim online counter-public, one that is sometimes 
challenging and sometimes reinforcing of existing authority structures in the real world. The 
writers identify four outcomes of using this technology that change and renegotiate authority 
structures in Muslim societies: (1) voiceless people now have a chance to speak in a public 
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platform; (2) different and controversial types of interpreting Islam have been appeared in the 
virtual space; (3) the Internet creates a new ground for the Islamic thoughts, a new Islamic 
context, and (4) it changes how Islam is presented, meaning that a specific modern on-line 
“communication style” is applied. 
As with Anderson, they believe that because the so-called third world has restricted 
access to this new technology, it is the Diaspora that makes the main contribution in presenting 
and interpreting religion in this new public sphere. This article makes some remarkable points 
regarding how religious authority on-line can be formed based on authority in the real world, 
resulting in similar structures of power relations. By analysing two traditional Muslim websites, 
this article concludes that despite being forms of new media, “the contents and the style of the 
two institutions’ podcast and videocast programmes are oriented towards classical concepts of 
Islamic scholarship and belief forming the basis of religious authority” (Scholz et al., 2008, 486). 
 On the other hand, this article also demonstrates that the Internet provides the opportunity 
for expressing a diversity of opinions and interests that challenge the traditional structure of 
religious authority. One of the websites analyzed identifies this new technology as a device that 
turns consumers into prosumers:
29
  
[I]n contrast to the consumer, the prosumer is mainly characterized by the specific way in 
which he makes use of media: With the help of the wide range of applications offered by 
the Web 2.0,
30
 he/she autonomously publishes his/her opinion and thereby contributes to 
an alternative online discourse having the potential to challenge established views and 
interpretations. (Scholz et al., 2008. 463)  
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 “The term prosumer was coined as early as 1980 by the futurist Alvin Toffler in his book The Third Wave” 
(Scholz et al., 2008. p. 463). 
30 
The term “Web 2.0” was coined by Dale Dougherty and Craig Cline in 2004 and popularized by Tim O’Reilly, 
founder of O’Reilly Media, a publishing house specialized in computing and software publications, by publishing 




Therefore, they can challenge the strict traditional structure of religious authority by debating 
religious issues based on their knowledge and interests.  
One of the main criticisms of this detailed article is that while it is looking for the 
structure of authority on podcasts, this article does not clearly define “authority” and its 
characteristics. The reader has to presume what authority means through the examples used in 
analysis. The second criticism is that this article does not describe its theoretical base. It only 
contains a case study of four Muslim podcasts and an analysis of whether they affirm or 
challenge existing religious authorities, based on their contents and form.  
As mentioned before, Karine Barzilai-Nahon and Gad Barzilai (2005) studied the 
interaction between religious fundamentalism and the Internet among ultra-Orthodox Jews. This 
study is one of the most structured analyses about the interaction between religious 
fundamentalism and the Internet which explains whether the relationship between the two can be 
reconciled. They identify four principal dimensions of religious fundamentalism that are in 
tension with the Internet: hierarchy, patriarchy, discipline, and seclusion.  
The first tension, hierarchy, is about charismatic authority (as defined by Weber) that 
imposes restrictions on using the Internet for their members; either by restricting access through 
censorship, filtering, and blocking, or by deletion of the information and issuing punishment for 
the publisher of the data. At the same time religious elites engage the Internet in maintaining 
their power and upholding religious beliefs by using email and encouraging people to attend 
religious practice (i.e., through their websites). Therefore, the community may use the Internet 
and still maintain its original institutional patterns of hierarchy and traditional authority. But, as 
the authors explain, “even under the harshest conditions of communal surveillance, individuals 
find ways to circumvent censorship, access forbidden material, and employ applications that 
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might contrast and challenge the community’s character and basic principles” (Barzilai-Nahon 
and Barzilai, 2005, p. 27). This means that religious authority is undermined and challenged by 
this new technology. In general, “it may be said that religious fundamentalist communities are a 
part of the globalization process, being tied to it, inter alia, through the usage of the Internet. At 
the same time, however, they continue to preserve their power structure” (Barzilai-Nahon and 
Barzilai, 2005, p. 27). 
The second tension refers to patriarchy. The main issue discussed here is the notion of 
how this new technology gives voice to the voiceless, especially women. Barzilai-Nahon and 
Barzilai (2005) explain two contradictory results of using the Internet in religious fundamentalist 
communities. While using the internet can stabilize the power relations of religious 
fundamentalism, it can be a public means of liberation and freedom from traditional patriarchy 
and other elements of religious fundamentalism as well. In their view, “the Internet has created 
better opportunities for feminine voices to be heard in religious fundamentalist contexts, 
although these opportunities are framed within the communal context and its hierarchy. Cultured 
technology mitigates the possible conflict between feminism, religiosity and community” (p. 28).   
Discipline is the third tension that Barzilai-Nahon and Barzilai address, and they discuss 
how printed texts have hierarchical authority and hyperlinks/texts do not contain those 
restrictions. By this they mean printed texts are disciplined in a sequential way by and through 
religious hierarchies; they are “linear, bounded, structured in a certain logic, and fixed” and also 
they have “a particular focus, a clearly defined audience and a single voice” (Wills, as cited in 
Barzilai-Nahon and Barzilai, 2005, p. 29). While the innovation of hypertext is that it enables 
interactions that break the rigid boundaries of the structure and firm logic. As they discuss, based 
on Wills (1999), “hypertext links information through associations and not sequentially. It 
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therefore breaks traditional hierarchy among texts” (as cited in Barzilai-Nahon and Barzilai, 
2005, p. 29).   
The last tension is about seclusion which may decrease and/or increase through use of the 
Internet in religious fundamentalist communities. This dimension shows the level of affinity and 
empathy among the members of a fundamentalist community which secludes the community 
from the world. The Internet can be used as a device through which people look for information 
about their own religion and beliefs but not others, while surfing the web. Therefore “the scope 
of seclusion may be enhanced through the Internet rather than reduced” (Barzilai-Nahon and 
Barzilai, 2005, p. 30). However, the Internet also opens up the ways for interactions among 
different ideas within a religion or among different religions; members of a religious community 
may create anonymous identities to reach alternative content that is forbidden or unacceptable in 
their own community (Barzilai-Nahon and Barzilai, 2005).  
Although they focus on the Jewish community, they have done very valuable work in 
analyzing the effect of the Internet on religious fundamentalism. Their work is one of the most 
important frameworks for analysing the impact of the Internet on traditional forms of religious 
life and authority, and it can be employed to examine the same impacts on Muslim communities.  
Heidi Campbell, as mentioned, is another thinker who has done several studies on the 
subject of religious authority on the Internet. Her work in 2007 “Who’s got the power? Religious 
authority and the Internet” focuses on how religion online provides an important space for 
studying what she refers to as “multiple layers of authority”, which she considers to be religious 
hierarchy, structure, ideology, and text. Campbell examined three communities – Christian, 
Jewish, and Muslim – in a case study to analyse whether religious authority is being influenced 
by the new technology of the Internet in these communities.  
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Regarding the first layer, religious hierarchy, Campbell refers to the roles and perceptions 
of religious leaders/authority figures as interpreters of religious knowledge. She explains how 
Christians and non-practicing Jews are apt to reflect critically on the influence of religious 
authority figures on community beliefs and practices, especially through the Internet. In 
discussing Islam’s presence online, she refers to Anderson (1999), who mentions that three new 
communities of interpreters of Islamic faith have arisen:  
1. Creole pioneers: those with professional-technical qualifications and transnational 
backgrounds who bring religious interest on-line as after-hours interests;  
2. Activist interpreters who recruit others toward certain discourses or groups and use the 
Internet to address a wider audience, and; 
3. Officializing discourses or recognized leaders from governmental councils and religious 
groups that affirm the universal access and a sense of participation in public spheres of 
listeners, watchers or browsers; this means that “webmasters or online moderators 
function as new agents of authority” (p. 1055). 
This illustrates that the Internet adds to religious life and challenges existing forms of religious 
authority.   
In terms of the “religious structure” layer, Campbell mainly refers to Barzilai-Nahon and 
Barzilai’s (2005) analysis of the role of the Internet in creating better opportunities for feminine 
voices. However, she adds that the online environment seems to both inform and stabilize 
traditional views of religious structure and discourse. For instance, most of the Christian 
websites contain information about traditional views of religion.  
To define “religious ideology”, her discussion focuses on the construction of the image of 
a single or global religious community. Based on her case study, the idea that religious ideology 
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takes precedence over other forms of identification shows that “community affiliation is not only 
important for individuals’ personal identification, but of critical importance with respect to 
solidifying corporate investment and acceptance of community belief” (Campbell, 2007, p. 
1057). 
With regard to the Internet, she looked for nuanced images of religious communal 
ideology that emerge from online interaction in all three religions. Campbell explains how the 
Internet is used to confirm or control religious identity construction, and how a strong emphasis 
is placed on trying to link the local religious structure, such as a church, to the global or 
worldwide Church. With regard to Islam, Campbell refers to Lawrence (2002), who says cyber-
Islam employs metaphors from the discourse of traditional, conservative Islam as a way to 
reinforce global structures, images, and beliefs about Islam online. 
Finally, to explain the “religious text” layer, she investigates questions such as: Are 
religious texts cited as sources of truth or community policy as frequently and in the same ways 
in online religious community conversation? Are traditional texts affirmed or criticized online 
with the same consistency as they are offline? Do the same texts serve the same roles in both 
contexts? 
She has completed a literature review on all studies in this area to help frame her theories 
about religious authority. However, she never explains why she applies the term “layer”, and she 
does not explain whether these “layers” should be ranked. Moreover, she tries to include 
Weber’s theoretical framework for defining authority but never explains the relationship between 
the layers that she identifies for authority and Weber’s definition of the different types of 
authority. Also, she does not elaborate how this multi-layered approach is more useful in 
studying authority online than Weber’s classification. 
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Furthermore, Campbell defines charismatic authority as “based on devotion to an 
individual who exhibits a particular characteristic, ideal, or exemplary quality that motivates 
others to adhere to the normative patterns sanctioned by that individual” (p. 1046), but this is 
misleading if we consider Weber’s definition. She reduces charisma to a person/individual 
whose words and deeds are obeyed because of him/her. However, Weber does not define 
charisma based on the personality of the individual who has authority, but bases it on the beliefs, 
words, and deeds of that person. Campbell’s definition is the other way around. 
There are some additional criticisms to be made of Campbell’s study. For instance, while 
she chooses Sufis as a group to represent Islam in her study, they are rarely known as Muslims. 
Therefore, she cannot infer what she found in their community as acceptable in all other Muslim 
communities. Secondly, in the section where she provides evidence with regard to the Jewish 
community, she argues about off-topic issues that do not pertain to the main research question of 
whether the Internet has influenced religious authority. Instead, she talks about the perspectives 
of religious people towards the new technology of the Internet and whether their religiosity is 
being affected by cyberspace.    
Overall, Campbell’s work is the best study on this topic and is referenced because this 
research asks the same question about the relationship between the online and offline religious 
communities and how the Internet affects different aspects of religious authority. This research is 
trying to respond to Campbell’s call for continued research on the four layers of religious 
authority. Therefore, this study will discuss the same issues that Campbell mentions, but will 
specifically focus on the Shiite Muslim community as expressed in the Persian blogosphere. In 
this regard, Campbell brings up useful questions that should be considered in forthcoming 
studies, such as: Do the online moderators perform a similar role as the religious leader? How 
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can religious organizations monitor and influence online groups? How do online discourse 
communities accept, reject, or redefine the dominant theologies and traditions? Do religious texts 
continue to serve as a primary source of authority in online groups, similar to the offline/official 
religious organizations? 
In a more recent study, Campbell (2010) focuses on religious authority in the 
blogosphere, specially addressing the claim that the Internet flattens hierarchies and gives voice 
to marginalized populations. The main question of her research is “how traditional forms of 
religious authority—namely roles, structures, beliefs and texts—are being presented and framed 
online” (p.252). Her exploratory study wants to answer the question of “how authority is framed 
within religious blogs in order to contribute to our understanding of how religious authority is 
regarded online in general, as well as what types of traditional religious roles, structures, beliefs 
and texts are primarily affirmed or challenged online” (p. 252). Although her discussion is 
limited to Christian weblogs, her study is one of the most fruitful regarding religious authority 
online.  Her quantitative analysis of the data she gathered from weblogs illustrates how Christian 
bloggers affirm or challenge traditional forms of religious authority. She concludes that 
while early studies of religion online suggested that the internet might primarily be used 
by religious users to challenge traditional sources of religious authority, this study is 
consistent with more recent claims that the Internet instead can serve as a source to 
empower religious authorities. (p. 269) 
 
She made this statement based on analysis of the blogs using the four layers of religious 
authority that she identified in her previous work.  
The same criticisms about the lack of connection between her work and Weber’s 
categorization of authority and definition of charismatic authority are still valid in this study. She 
refers to religious authority as a kind of legitimacy that comes from a divine/supernatural 
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referent, but she does not talk about the essence of religious authority and where we can locate it 
based on Weber’s categorization.  
This will lead to an analysis of the selected blog’s posts according to Campbell’s 
classification of four forms by which authority is expressed and based on the four dimensions of 


















Chapter 3: The Presentation of Shiite Authority in the Persian Blogosphere 
In countries where freedom of expression is limited due to religious fundamentalism and 
political restrictions of its political regime, the Internet as a technology which contains various 
forms of social media, such as weblogs, is playing an increasingly visible role in the areas of 
religion and politics. In the months after the Iranian presidential election, Iranians blogged 
heavily to express themselves and to challenge or support the unpredictable incidents following 
the election in 2009. Analyzing the content of these blogs presents a novel opportunity for 
analysts to gain insight into the public opinion and mood of Iranian society in general and about 
their opinions regarding religious authority in particular. Besides, this kind of study documents 
the truism suggesting that the Internet and society have mutual influences on each other. It also 
elucidates the statement that each political and religious group benefit from this technology to 
fulfil their needs. This research also tries to explain any possible unrevealed effects the Internet, 
as a secular and liberal technology, has on religious fundamentalist communities.       
This thesis analyses a selection of Persian blogs cases in two ways simultaneously. The 
first analysis is based on Campbell’s (2007) suggestions regarding the presentation of religious 
authority online. Campbell identifies four layers to be analysed: (1) religious hierarchy, (2) 
religious structures, (3) religious ideology, and (4) religious texts. Accordingly, this exploratory 
study seeks to address the question of how authority is framed within Shiite Persian weblogs in 
order to contribute to the understanding of how religious authority is regarded online in general, 
as well as what types of traditional religious roles, structures, beliefs and texts are primarily 
affirmed or challenged online. This research seeks to identify which specific layer is being 
affected in the interference of the Internet. Is it the power position of traditional religious leaders 
that is presented on the weblogs, such as the ulama, and mujtahids in the contemporary context 
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of Iranian society? Is it the established structure by which policy decisions are made and 
information is passed on to Shiite community members, such as hawza and religious educational 
system of Iran, mosques and holy places, or the Shiite-run government? Is it the whole shared 
ideology of Shiite community or the particular interpretation of official religious rhetoric and 
teaching from the Quran and hadith? By differentiating between these layers of Shiite authority, 
more accurate claims can be made as to which specific forms of authority are being challenged 
or otherwise supported through the Internet.  
The second level of the study is based on Barzilai-Nahon and Barzilai’s work (2005). 
Since religious fundamentalist communities are generally suspicious of technology and 
cyberspace, they see the Internet as a threat to the cultural preservation of their community 
(Barzilai-Nahon and Barzilai, 2005). This thesis is interested mainly in the interchanges between 
the Internet and Iranian Shiite community as a fundamentalist religious group. More specifically, 
following Barzilai-Nahon and Barzilai’s (2005) study, this research analyses the utilization of the 
Internet by religious fundamentalists to maintain and strengthen the essential origins of 
fundamentalism in the Iranian society, while modernist reformists also use this technology in 
order to reach their goals. Moreover, based on Barzilai-Nahon and Barzilai’s (2005) study, this 
thesis is in search for any hidden tensions or changes that may be caused by utilizing the Internet 
in the religiously fundamental society of Iran.   
As noted, Barzilai-Nahon and Barzilai (2005) introduce four principle dimensions of 
religious fundamentalism that are affected by interaction with the Internet: (1) hierarchy, (2) 
patriarchy, (3) discipline and (4) seclusion. Based on this analysis, this thesis seeks to identify 
the various forms of tension that are involved in the Persian Weblogs, as illustrated through 
examples from the weblog posts. Do the Iranian Shiite weblogs create any tension with the 
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hierarchical essence of the Shiite authority of the ulama by strengthening individuals’ voices and 
the free flow of information? Or are the weblogs tools serving the authority’s goals and 
preserving their situation? Do Persian weblogs downgrade patriarchy by giving women more of 
a chance to be heard and acknowledged, empowering their feminine identity in the Iranian Shiite 
community? Do Persian weblogs create any tension with the highly disciplined behaviour 
encouraged by the traditional ways of interpreting the Quran and ahadith’s sacred texts? Do 
Persian weblogs reduce the seclusion of religious fundamentalist Shiite community? Does the 
Internet prevent community members from external cultural transplantation?  Is the Internet 
utilized to spread the Shiite ideology beyond its boundary? 
 Following the model that Campbell suggests for studying religious authority on the 
Internet, this chapter is divided into different topics, based on the layers of authority. In each 
section, there are related subjects that are discussed through examples from the blog postings. 
The selected examples from the weblogs also expose any possible tension that may cause by the 
Internet in the fundamentalist community of Iran.   
 
Religious Hierarchy  
In Campbell’s (2007) study, religious hierarchy refers to the roles and perceptions of 
recognized religious or community leaders. In our case, it refers to authority figures or traditional 
leadership figures such as the Prophet Mohammad, Imams, political leaders and the clerical body 






What history tells us about wilayat al-faqih? 
Many Shiite mujtahids, clerics and charismatic figures have been discussed in these 
weblogs. Tourjan heavily focuses on the ulama’s life and the historical background of the hawza, 
mujtahids and clerics. The bloggers of Tourjan tend to discuss the ulama and the religious-social 
issues of the current society from the perspective of a historical understanding of the origins and 
the essence of the ulama’s ideas and efforts.  
For example, when they want to talk about the source of the wilayat al-faqih theory they 
refer to Ayatollah Burujerdi and his unique charismatic authority over the Shiite society. They 
mention that since the death of Ayatollah Burujerdi – about fifty years ago – there has been no 
sole grand mujtahid for the Shiite society all over the world. Even Ayatollah Khomeini, with his 
powerful charismatic leadership of the revolution, did not have a remarkable population of 
followers outside of Iran.  
Ayatollah Burujerdi revived the hawza of Qom in 1945, which had waned after the death 
of its founder, Ayatollah Abdul Karim Haeri. Tourjan explains how he empowered the hawza 
and introduced it as the main seminary for Shiite clerics. 
Burujerdi, with his wisdom and leadership, made Qom the main centre for Shiites. After 
his death, his students restored his legacy and the power of Qom’s seminary. In 
Burujerdi’s time, many of the ulama could not even think about changing the centrality 
of the thousand years old seminary of Najaf [Iraq] to Qom. However, with the charisma 
and authority of Ayatollah Burujerdi, that visionary idea came true. (Tourjan, 2009) 
 
Moreover, the political aspect of Ayatollah Burujerdi’s opposition to the Shah should not 
be ignored in this context. Borujerdi’s belief in quietism in state political matters extended to 
keeping silent in public on such problematic issues. It is thought that with this silence, the Shah 
ensured more religious instruction in state schools, tightened control of cinemas and other 
offensive secular entertainment during the holy month of Ramadan and the Muharram 
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ceremonies (Algar, 1972). Although he had been in contact with the Shah, many believed that 
Ayatollah Burujerdi did not agree with the growing despotic totalitarianism of the Shah’s 
government (Cottam, 1965). Ayatollah Burujerdi did not try to conceal his disapproval of some 
of the regime’s policies, but made it clear that he was in no way prepared to promote disorder.
31
 
 Regarding the theory of wilayat al-faqih, Fathi and Abtahi write that although Ayatollah 
Burujerdi resisted participating in any political issues of his time – such as the Oil 
Nationalization Movement and the coup d’état against Mosadeq or the Fadayeean’s uprising
32
 – 
he was the first mujtahid who believed in the expansion of the official authority of the clerical 
body. He believed that people have to obey all the rules that a political system defines for its 
society whether the rulers are religious or not. In this regard, the bloggers present a story from 
                                                 
31
 What is meaningful here is that Ayatollah Burujerdi had even more power than the Shah in mobilizing people 
toward a specific political and ideological direction and also put pressure on the Shah to change in his decisions. 
This was the reason that the Shah never confronted him directly, instead he sought good relation with Burujerdi and 
his followers. For instance, when the Shah’s government introduced the “land reform bill” to parliament, landlords 
appealed to Ayatollah Burujerdi and other religious leaders to speak out against this policy, which they believed it 
was unconstitutional and in violation of the Shiite laws. This time, Ayatollah Burujerdi took action and sent a letter 
to Ayatollah Behbahani. Ayatollah Behbahani was a member of parliament and pro-constitutionalism, but he was 
strictly against the anti-monarchy movements that had begun during that time. The division between those religious 
leaders who were in a collegial position to the Kingship and those ulama, such as Ayatollah Burujerdi, who were not 
in any official position, but held great power of charismatic authority, had continued from the Safavid era until that 
time. 
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 Navvab-e Safavi was a cleric who established the Fadaeeyan-e Islam (Devotees of Islam) organization, a Shiite 
militant organization (1945) who later assassinated two prime ministers. Mentioning the Fadayeean organization is 
important for this thesis because not only was Navvab identified as a charismatic figure by his followers, but he also 
was one of the few clerics that clearly opposed the Shah while Ayatollah Burujerdi was quiet. This means that he 
even confronted the traditional way of religiosity which remained quiet against the pro-secular regime of the Shah. 
Moreover, Fadaeeyan’ similarities in fundamentalist ideology and methods to the contemporary religious hard-
liners in Iran cannot be ignored, especially when its younger members later joined Hey’at-e Mo’talefeh Islam (the 
Coalition of Islamic groups), which is considered to be the most important hard-liner group in post-revolution Iran. 
Navvab was one of the first religious leaders who strictly believed in an Islamic government and suggested a rough 
plan for it. He suggested a new type of ideological political system in which the ulama would not be a collegial 
party. Rather, they became the head of the political system. He argued that in the Shiite state the leading faqih 
should head the government and that parliament should be a consultative body (not a legislative one) which would 
find ways of dealing with problems on the basis of Islamic principles and under the supervision of the leading 
ulama. He also argued that there must be a free parliamentary election in order to elect Islamic, Shiite pure and 
competent representatives. No Islamic, impure or anti-religious people had the right to be elected (Taghavi, 2004).  
The Fadayeean organization and their ideology were confronted by society; they neither had support from the 
intellectuals nor from the ulama, except for a few. However, their ideology for the Islamic Shiite government was 
supported during and after the Islamic Revolution of Iran, because Ayatollah Khomeini was one of the few ulama 
who indirectly supported Navvab.   
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Ayatollah Burujerdi’s life when some of the ulama and clerics revolted against the construction 
of the shrine and the mosque in Qom by the government. It was not traditionally acceptable for 
them that the government destroy a part of the mosque in order to expand it. But Ayatollah 
Burujerdi reminded them that the rulers have the authority to make social decisions and people 
should accept and obey the official law, even if it seems not to be traditionally acceptable. Based 
on this belief, Tourjan writes:  
By giving the government complete authority for ruling society, Ayatollah Burujerdi 
cultivated the theory of “wilayat al-faqih”, which says that if the ulama become the rulers 
of the state, their power must be unrestricted. However, he never tried to take action 
based on this theory. Many of his close adherents believed that he, like his grand mentor 
Akhound-e Khorasani, doubted the ability of the clerical body of the hawza to rule 
society. However, based on this belief, eight years after the death of Ayatollah Burujerdi, 
Ayatollah Khomeini, who was one of his disciples, officially introduced the theoretical 
structure of “wilayat al-faqih” by publishing a series of lectures and notes in Najaf while 
he was in exile. (Tourjan, 2009)          
 
By conveying the story of this very basic stage of the wilayat al-faqih theory, Tourjan 
directly presents the first layer of the authority that Campbell (2007) suggests: the role of the 
grand Ayatollah in proposing a new structure for the Shiite society. By referring to this history, 
Tourjan raises some important points. First, it presents the idea that the theory of wilayat al-faqih 
was not an innovation of Ayatollah Khomeini; this statement is against what the regime always 
promotes about the basis of this theory. Second, by stating that “although Ayatollah Burujerdi 
proposed the theory, he never got involved in any political activities” and “his close adherents 
believed that he doubted the ability of the clerical body of the hawza to rule the society” 
(Tourjan, 2009), Tourjan wants to clear the ground for thinking about the inadequacies and 
failures of the clerical leadership of the current political system in Iran. As it explains, Ayatollah 
Burujerdi – the sole mujtahid with charismatic authority, not only inside Iran, but also worldwide 
– suspected the consequences of the clerical rulership. Therefore, Tourjan maintains that it is 
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essential that the theory of wilayat al-faqih, which has been held by Iranian society for more than 
30 years, be revised and discussed, based on its achievements and failures. This statement is 
supported by other posts that discuss the ulama who were among the opponents of the theory of 
wilayat al-faqih, such as Ayatollah Shariat-Madari, Ayatollah Khoie, and Ayatollah Bahjat.  
This notion is a new way of thinking about the theory of wilayat al-faqih. In fact, as 
Barzilai-Nahon and Barzilai (2005) mention, the Internet provides a new level of discussion 
about religious matters in a fundamentalist community. Although debates about the theory of 
wilyat al-faqih were common in the early years of the revolution, it has since been marked as a 
sensitive issue, for it religious and security reasons, and has not been discussed publically. There 
were many newspapers and journals during the president Khatami of the reformist which were 
forcibly closed as a result of having published such articles. However, the blogosphere creates a 
new public ground for these sensitive debates. The Internet generates a public sphere in which 
the supporters and the opponents of the wilayat al-faqih theory present their ideas and have 
discussions. 
 
Religious intellectuals perspective   
Moreover, regarding the theory of wilayat al-faqih, there is another remarkable point 
among Tourjan’s posts. Fathi and Abtahi, the bloggers, conducted a series of interviews with 
religious intellectuals about their relationship with Ayatollah Khomeini, before and after the 
revolution. Among these, there is an interview with Mohammad Basteh-Negar, who is known as 
a member of the Religious-Nationalist Movement and was a political activist before and after the 
revolution. He raises a different meaning of “the absolute empowerment of wilayat al-faqih”. 
Traditionally wilayat al-faqih refers to the rule of the jurist who heads the state, but there are 
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legal institutions in the political system that run society, including the government, judicial 
system, and the parliament that are independent of him. As one of the posts in Tourjan explains, 
the main developer of the theory of wilayat al-faqih after the revolution, Ayatollah Montazeri, 
says: 
The main duty for the “wilayat al-faqih” is to lead, advise and guide society, but he is 
not supposed to make decisions for parliament… even Ayatollah Khomeini cannot 
intervene in the duty of the government and the parliament. (Tourjan, 2010) 
 
Some of the ulama, among them Ayatollah Khomeini, however, believe in “the absolute 
empowerment of wilayat al-faqih”. There is a general agreement on the meaning of “the absolute 
empowerment of wilayat al-faqih”, which is that the authority of the supreme leader (as the 
“wally al-faqih”) is unrestricted and above the constitution. But, as initiated, some people have 
tried to interpret it differently. Baste-Negar is among those people who believe in decreasing and 
restricting the power of the wally al-faqih to divine knowledge and Shari’a law. He says: 
I believe that by proposing the doctrine of “the absolute empowerment of wilayat al-
faqih”, Imam
33
 [Ayatollah Khomeini] wanted to present a type of religious leadership 
that can act free of the traditional restrictions from the traditional fiqh [Shari’a law]. That 
way, he wanted to make the doctrine flexible to be applicable in modern society. I believe 
the title of the Ayatollah Khomeini’s doctrine should be changed from wilayat al-faqih to 
something less problematic. (Tourjan, 2010)   
  
Although this claim illustrates the belief in the hierarchical position of Ayatollah 
Khomeini, at the same time it contains the notion of reducing the power of the supreme leader to 
the religious aspects of society and empowers the idea of secularism. Furthermore, by this claim 
he introduces Ayatollah Khomeini as a pioneer and anti-traditional religious leader who 
proposed a theory involving revolutionary and modern perspectives at odds with the traditional 
                                                 
33
 Imam is an honorary title for the successors of the Prophet Muhammad in Shiism. But there are some other 
leaders who are called Imam because of their spiritual closeness to the Prophet’s guidance (both deeds and words) in 
Shiite history. For example, in recent centuries, the Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Musa Sadr were known as 
Imams. What is interesting here is that many Iranian religious intellectuals have avoided using this tile for Ayatollah 
Khomeini in recent decades to demonstrate their criticisms of the political system that he established after the 
revolution.   
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fiqh. Here again the points of Barzilai-Nahon and Barzilai’s study make sense. Different ideas 
which challenge the dominant ideology generally do not have chance to be published in the 
printed media, newspapers and other official media. The Internet provides this new opportunity 
for the modernist bloggers to reflect new and veiled thoughts. However, hardliners also use this 
technology to prove their own viewpoints. The hierarchy is being challenged by both groups of 
modernists and fundamentalists.       
Related to this point, as Campbell (2007) notes, attention should be given to how the 
religious authority of the leaders emerges online, and how it is described. Also, the influence of 
the description within the local faith community and tradition as a whole should be considered. 
By introducing Ayatollah Khomeini as a charismatic Shiite leader who revolutionarily broke the 
traditional borders of hawza and Iranian society, Tourjan brings a new aspect of his religious 
charismatic leadership into light which may create tension with the religious hierarchy. The 
Internet enables individuals to re-define and analyse a restrictive role and functional power of 
authority based on his/her understanding and make it public. So that when Tourjan reflects an 
undiscovered and less approved aspect of Ayatollah Khomeini’s perspective (anti-tradition of 
hawza) through Baste-Negar’s interview, the usual traditional understanding of the role of Shiite 
revolutionary charisma, Ayatollah Khomeini is challenged.       
Another notable point here is that in the free space of the Internet, not only the famous 
and religious professionals and politicians present their thoughts, but common people and 
infamous religion students and unknown politicians also have the chance to make their views 
known. As Barzilai-Nahon and Barzilai discusses “hierarchies constitute and are based on elites 
that control the flow of information” (p. 27), however, the Internet makes the opportunity non-
elites to spread their thoughts and becomes one of the sources of tension in a religiously 
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fundamentalist society such as Iran. This is one of the consequences of the usage of the Internet, 
the free flow of information by which unknown religious students, such as Fathi and Abtahi, can 
present thier controversial viewpoints about a sensitive issue, the theory of wilayat al-faqih. 
 
Reformist and conservative ulama 
Religious-political crises in Iran today are approached differently in these five weblogs. 
For instance, while Tourjan has questioned the current hierarchical system of religious authority 
based on the historical background, Menbar tends to discuss its support for a specific political 
party (the conservative-fundamentalist party) and reports the special events going on around the 
author in Qom. In Menbar, the historical documents that appear about the wilayat al-faqih 
mainly refer to the author’s criticisms of the mujtahids who do not believe in this theory. More 
particularly, Najmi, Menbar’s blogger, uses historical documents to explain that some of the pro-
modernist-reformist mujtahids were among the actual supporters of the “absolute empowerment 
of wilayat al-faqih” and only became opponents of the theory recently. He aggressively attacks 
Ayatollah Saneiy who was the attorney general in the era of Ayatollah Khomeini and even 
Ayatollah Khamenei, but who recently became one of the main challengers of the wilayat al-
faqih since the emergence of the reformist government of Ayatollah Khatami in 1997. Najmi 
presents some quotes from Ayatollah Saneiy from twenty years ago which demonstrate his belief 
in the “absolute empowerment” of the wally al-faqih: 
“Wally al-faqih” governs everything, he can even rule against the Constitution and 
parliament’s laws, but he would not use his power to do so except for very specific 
problems. The value of the Constitution relies on the supreme leader’s approval. Since 
our reference is God’s law, which is the basis of the supreme leader’s actions and 
decisions, […] disobedience of his commands is considered as a big sin. If he commands 
a rule, no one can refer to other ulama or any ruler to act differently since his statements 




This illustrates that regardless of Saneiy’s political perspective, Najmi strongly believes 
in the role of the ulama as the main authority in Iranian society. Since he believes that his 
audiences will be convinced to support the theory of “the absolute empowerment” by this 
rationale, he cites the quotation from Ayatollah Saneyi. He cites this example for at least two 
more reasons, first to state the importance of the position of wilayat al-faqih and second to show 
that Ayatollah Saneiy, who is one of the Green Movement’s supporters, has been challenging his 
own beliefs about the theory of wilayat al-faqih and Ayatollah Khamenei, as the supreme leader. 
This way, he tries to prove that the reformists do not have adequate reliability since they have 
changed their mind during the past 30 years. This is one of the examples that shows how the 
traditional authority of religious leaders is being challenged by a young religious scholar. This 
type of criticism was rarely published in the public sphere of society before the emergence of the 
Internet. This is because ulama were always known as the respectful heirs of the Imams in the 
pre-modern society of Iran and their political-religious beliefs could not be questioned by a 
journalist or a student.  
Moreover, the notion of gathering and publishing historical data is one of the most useful 
methods that every blogger uses to convince their audience. In this case Najmi uses old 
newspapers to show his point of view against the modernist-reformist. This notion refers to 
another dimension of tension between the Internet and a religious fundamentalist community that 
Barzilai-Nahon and Barzilai (2005) refer to, discipline. Discipline is defined as “a set of practices 
and a consciousness that exist anywhere and anytime in communal life” (p. 29) and is not solely 
a textual phenomenon. As Barzilai-Nahon and Barzilai (2005) mention, using hypertext in the 
Internet era is a phenomenon which challenges the existing discipline of the linear and structured 
format of the texts. This means that by referring and making links to old newspapers and 
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publishing it in a blog post, Najmi unintentionally creates a slight but invisible tension in the 
bases of the religious fundamentalist community. As Barzilai-Nahon and Barzilai (2005) write, 
although religious fundamentalists apply this new technology as a tool for their own goals, the 
tensions are unavoidable even if they do not consider it as a tension or one of the consequences 
of this new secular technology.  
 
Charisma against the traditional system 
Tourjan and Menbar discuss different political and social aspects of the charismatic 
leadership of the ulama in different eras. Although these bloggers support opposite political 
parties, by reviewing their weblogs we repeatedly encounter statements that describe the major 
characteristics of charismatic leadership. For instance, when Tourjan published an interview with 
Ehsan Naraghi, a sociologist known as a religious intellectual, Dr. Naraghi says: 
No other Ayatollah can compare to Imam Khomeini. His goal was establishing a 
religious state […] today one of the main issues with mujtahids is that they are too 
worried about public perceptions. Ayatollah Khomeini did not worry about what common 
people would think and say when he issued fatawa; he was convinced of his religious 
knowledge and power. For example, his fatawa that made it legal and religiously 
acceptable to play and learn music and chess were totally anti-traditional. (Tourjan, 2009)  
 
Referring to Campbell’s theoretical framework, religious hierarchy, specifically in its 
charismatic form, is evidently present in the Persian blogosphere. The example above illustrates 
how Ayatollah Khomeini was self-confident about his divine knowledge and about the reaction 
of Iranian society toward his fatawa. Naraghi mentions a fatawa that caused controversy among 
traditional hawza scholars and mujtahids to show the differences between a charismatic leader 
and a traditional one. Although there are other examples in this weblog that talk about the 
charismatic characteristics of Ayatollah Khomeini, Tourjan does not heavily invest in describing 
this aspect of the Shiite leadership. What is more important in this [reformist] weblog is the way 
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that the critiques of the current political system are being pictured in the larger framework of the 
ulama’s social leadership during the Shiite political history.  
We may also consider some of the posts on Tourjan as a sign of a reduction in the 
seclusion of the Shiite fundamentalist perspective. The Internet may actually both decrease and 
increase the level of seclusion of religious fundamentalist communities. As Barzilai-Nahon and 
Barzilai (2005) explain, fundamentalist communities modify and localize Internet technology in 
ways that preserve the community’s seclusion in different ways; for instance by forcing their 
members to interact through local and controlled Internet platform, by motivating members to 
use the Internet to gather information about their own religion and not to learn about other 
religions, or by censoring and filtering the unaccepted data. However, this new technology 
creates opportunity for people to search for new perspectives and outside sources that may not be 
acceptable and/or are forbidden in their community. 
  Tourjan does not include any external religious or secular sources in its posts, however, 
by posting the series of interviews that the bloggers conducted about the relationship between 
Ayatollah Khomeini and religious intellectuals, they refer to non-traditional sources which define 
and interpret religious hierarchy differently from the communal understanding. The 
consequences of Ayatollah Khomeini’s charismatic leadership and the revolution have been 
described and analysed in a very strict and biased context within Iran. In fact, it is not considered 
acceptable for the state to talk about Ayatollah Khomeini and the revolution in a critical way. 
Even discussions and arguments by religious intellectuals who had official positions in 
the government during the life of Ayatollah Khomeini are not considered acceptable, since they 
raise fundamental criticisms of the institutionalization of religion in Iran. Since, Fathi and 
Abtahi, Tourjan’s authors, are both from a clerical background, this type of posts, which refer to 
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religious intellectuals’ experiences and arguments, can be considered as a sign of reducing 
seclusion within the Iranian Shiite fundamentalist community. This is because the political 
regime of Iran draws a line between acceptable sources and inacceptable ones. Fundamentalist 
authority would like people to refer only to the certain type of information. The fact that these 
bloggers, who work within the system, are drawing people’s attention to new and alternative 
sources of information about Ayatollah Khomeini is potentially problematic. Their work breaks 
down the barriers that the regime creates between the official interpretation of Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s ideology and other types of interpretation. In that sense, these interviews and posts 
are considered an attack on the attempt of the regime for maintaining seclusion in the Iranian 
society.    
In this sense, when Tourjan published at least eight posts about Ayatollah Khomeini that 
contained interviews with religious intellectuals, it relied on a source that is not officially 
approved. Furthermore, one of the interviewees, Ebrahim-Yazdi, has been a member of the 
“Freedom Movement”
34
 since before the revolution. Although he was one of the closest 
acquaintances of Ayatollah Khomeini during his exile in France, and had been politically active 
in the very first years of the Shiite state, after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini he spent many 
years in prison for his support of the reformist party and was labelled as an ally of the United 
States (enemy).  
Tourjan published an interview with Ebrahim-Yazdi in January 2010, some months after 
the presidential election, yet they had originally interviewed him five years earlier. One of the 
                                                 
34
 Nehzat-e Azadi-e Iran is an Iranian political organization which was founded in 1961 by some political and 
religious figures; religious intellectuals. Despite being outlawed by the prevailing regime in Iran, the group 
continues to exist. Most of the founders were in the government in the beginning years after the revolution. Now this 
organization is labeled as a threat to wilayat al-faqih’s status and most of the well-known members of this 
organization experiences hardship and prison during the resent two decades.  
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unstated reasons why they decided to publish such posts was that after the election, 
fundamentalists tried to analyse Ayatollah Khomeini’s ideology in a specific way, to provide 
support for their goals and the aggressive attacks and restrictions they imposed on the people. 
Within this context, referring to the nationalist-religious movements (such as Freedom 
Movement) can be considered as a form of reduction in religious and political seclusion that 
shows a series of small changes that affect the fundamentalist atmosphere of Iranian Shiite 
policy. 
Moreover, although the subject of these interviews was specific to the relationship 
between Ayatollah Khomeini and religious intellectuals, the interviews presented aspects of 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s life and beliefs that have not been explored for many years. For example, 
Ebrahim-Yazdi explained that, 
A year before the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, some clerics, for the third time, asked for 
his permission to dissolve the “Freedom Movement organization”. He refused to permit 
them and said that Bazargan, Sahabi, and Yazdi are not our allies, but they are Muslims. 
Later on, when some other clerics asked Ayatollah Khomeini why he did not let them 
dissolve the “Freedom Movement organization” when it opposed the clerics, he replied, 
“they do not oppose the clerics, they oppose you!” Then they said, “but they are against 
you, too”. And Ayatollah Khomeini answered, “So what? Am I one of the principles of 
faith (Usul-i Din)?”
35
  (Tourjan, 2010)           
 
These types of references could not be found in official sites. It is rare that 
fundamentalists talk about Ayatollah Khomeini from the perspective of an opponent. Therefore, 
the series of interviews with religious intellectuals published in Tourjan again reflect the fourth 
tension between the Internet and religious fundamentalism: that of seclusion (Barzilai-Nahon & 
Barzilai, 2005). Readers of these types of weblogs consider these bloggers, regardless of their 
                                                 
35
 The statement means that he considered himself as a political leader who has opponents in the state. Being 
opposed to him neither warrants shouting down other voices nor saying that their opposition makes them non-
religious.   
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reformist or conservative perspective, as supporters and presenters of the traditional and 
charismatic religious authority of the fundamentalist community of Iran. However, the 
information that has been published about the leadership of the society in these posts has never 
been released in the official media. The power of this new technology opens accessibility to 
information which can be used to challenge religious fundamentalism, especially since most of 
the information is not based on officially acceptable and approved sources. They can be 
considered as the outside sources which were not available for the public before in the pre-
Internet era.  
In the traditional way, unknown and non-official clerics, such as Fathi, Abtahi and Najmi, 
would not have the opportunity to reveal their viewpoint for the public of the Iranian community 
in the pre-Internet era. This is because they should first become eligible, after many years of 
study, to run a majlis
36
 or talk on a menbar, which are the two practical ways to be officially 
heard in the public. This notion refers to the term “counter public” that Scholz et al. (2008) 
mention in their study of the Muslim podcasts. In their research, they found that these new small 
digital media, such as podcast, weblogs, and social networks create a new level for making 
dialogue about religious issues which are not presented in the formal media and by the officials. 
Therefore, individuals and groups take this opportunity to make a counter public sphere which is 
relatively untouched by the state control.  
 
Fundamentalist perspective  
However, as Scholz et al. (2008) state the Muslim online counter public sometimes 
challenges, sometimes reinforces, the existing authority structures. For instance Menbar blog 
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 Religious gathering.  
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repeatedly emphasizes the charismatic characteristics of Ayatollah Khamenei, the current 
supreme leader, by referring to local and official sources. When Najmi reports the last visit of 
Ayatollah Khamenei to the ulama in Qom, he mainly talks about the welcoming atmosphere of 
the formal and informal meetings. He explains that Ayatollah Khamenei, is such a friendly leader 
in face-to-face interactions that he did not feel that Ayatollah Khamenei is the supreme leader 
but a friend of all those ulama. He says, 
Each Ayatollah comes in the room and heads toward Ayatollah Khamenei to greet him. 
They are talking quietly while smiling; the journalists around the room are curious about 
the reason for the smiles […] some of the ulama are accompanied by their sons and 
grandsons/daughters […] a little girl recites a poem for the supreme leader and Ayatollah 
Khamenei asks one of the ulama to give her a gift… (Menbar, 2009) 
 
Related to this passage, as Dawson (2011) writes, charismatic leaders “are known for 
their seeming sensitivity to the needs of others – they make a personal connection with those 
they meet, showing interest in their lives, no matter how brief the encounter may be” (p. 6). This 
is the exact situation that Najmi narrates for the reader on his weblog. He pictures Ayatollah 
Khamenei as a charismatic leader who makes a friendly and close bond with his disciples. He 
shows that Ayatollah Khamenei is aware of the needs of the people, even the children. However, 
it is clear that Najmi and other fundamentalists believe in the usage of the Internet and moulding 
its application to their own needs. However, it is not clear whether they aware of the 
consequences of their own usage in terms of moving their audience toward a more rational, anti-
traditional society.    
Considering these examples of characteristics of charismatic leadership confirms 
Barzilai-Nahon and Barzilai (2005) and illustrates how they are applicable to Shiite society as 
well. In their study of the Jewish ultra-Orthodox community and the effect of the Internet on 
hierarchy, they found that although the rabbis warn the community against the dangers of having 
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the Internet in their homes, they have also had to adapt to the changing reality and to allow some 
connections to cyberspace. Therefore, “the Internet, in ultra-Orthodox society, has been 
culturally modified to fit the context of its communal needs and structure” (Barzilai-Nahon & 
Barzilai, 2005, p. 33). Although there are many secular weblogs published in the Persian Shiite 
community, the religious bloggers use the Internet as a tool for preserving and strengthening the 
communal hierarchy. Moreover, since these two bloggers are students in hawza, they are 
monitored by the religious authorities and the intelligence service. This means that even the 
reformist-modernist bloggers of Tourjan know that if they question the hierarchical system or 
make a direct critique, their weblog will be filtered and censored and they may end up in 
custody.
37
 Therefore, they do not challenge the hierarchy directly and openly. Rather, they use 
methods such as historical analysis, for example through the life of the great ulama, to compare 
the current problems of religious hierarchy with the previous models. The coercive methods, that 
the Iranian regime uses toward the reformists’ online activity explains the power of the Internet 
and its influences on the society. This is shows that not only the new generations of Iranians pay 
much attention to the Internet content and use it to assert their viewpoints, the political regime is 
also aware of the effects of the Internet on the society.    
 
The issue of legitimacy: internal and external viewpoints  
Other bloggers, such as Jami in his weblog, Sibestan, directly criticizes Ayatollah 
Khamenei’s behaviour and policy. He frequently publishes posts which contain analyses of the 
sources of violence and hatred of the fundamentalist segment of the society for the reformist part, 
before and specifically after the election in 2009. He condemns Ayatollah Khamenei for his law-
                                                 
37
 In fact, Tourjan is filtered at least two times, and the authors know people cannot read it freely without filter-
breakers. Ali, one of the bloggers, spent some month in prison after the Presidential election in 2009.   
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breaking policies that follow the example of Russian, Chinese and North Korean regimes in 
deceiving the public in order to get their vote and preserve the prestige of the regime. Jami 
directly questions and challenges the eligibility of Ayatollah Khamenei for the leadership of the 
society in addition to the criticism about the theory of wilayat al-faqih. As he writes:  
I think the hypothesis  being confirmed that Ayatollah Khamanei is trying to establish an 
Islamic regime but not a republic one… During these years, he has trained a new 
generation of managers who have key positions in the regime. One of the remarkable 
characteristics of all these managers is that they are not religious clerics so they cannot 
oppose Ayatollah Khamenei’s commands and statements in politics and leadership. Mr. 
Khamenei whose eligibility for being mujtahid has being questioned since the very first 
days of his leadership, always tries to train his own official people. His religious 
knowledge is not comparable with the knowledge of the great ulama of the current 
hawza’s clerical body and he cannot parallel himself with them. He is the leader of the 
panegyrists who are less educated than him. His style of leadership is for people like 
Ahmadinejad who are not so clever or sharp. (Jami, 2009)           
 
As it is obvious, he is judging and questioning the knowledge and the leadership of 
Ayatollah Khamenei who is known to have charisma, after Ayatollah Khomeini, for a part of the 
Iranian population. In his weblog, Jami has published many posts under this theme and 
perspective. The above quotation shows how religious authority in the layer of hierarchy and 
leadership is being challenged. What is more important in these types of posts is that not only is 
Ayatollah Khamenei being judged, but also the structure of charismatic authority is being 
challenged by a journalist who has no chance to express his criticism in an offline public sphere. 
However, through the free space of the Internet, he can speak up and inform the public about the 
malfunctions of current religious structure of Iran. He runs some news websites and his major 
profession and goal is establishing a democratic and free media for the Iranian society. He would 
not have any power and influence on the Iranian society without his weblogs and websites. 
Moreover, there are two more points to consider here: first, it is important to note that Jami, and 
many other bloggers with the same perspective, are people of the Iranian of the Diaspora; he 
75 
 
lives in the Netherlands. It should not be ignored that the idea of challenging the charisma  of the 
leadership is more common among the Iranian of the Diaspora, as compared to those who live 
inside Iran. The restricted access of common people to the internet, in addition to the filtering of 
such sites, and the threats of retaliation by the Iranian government, have all played their part in 
hindering the voice of many in opposing this layer of authority.  
This notion leads us to the second point: people who live abroad have a better chance of 
being heard and they become potential leaders, or at least guides, for those who are silent. In 
fact, the Internet has created opportunities for leadership (Campbell, 2007) for those who are 
active and have loud voices in cyberspace. However, it seems that by filtering the Internet and 
restricting the voices of those who live inside Iran, the religious fundamentalist regime of Iran 
creates more chance for the Iranian of the Diaspora, who are mostly non-religious, to become 
active and progressive. Even religious clerics from outside of Iran, such as Ayatollah Mohsen 
Kadivar, have been better heard in comparison to their time in Iran. This is because the Internet 
and virtual communication give power to such individuals in their respective communities.   
Moreover, even considering all circumstances that restrict access to the Internet in Iran, 
the censoring and filtering process, as well as political threats, there are still many critics from 
inside Iran who try to develop their virtual life through their weblogs and other ways on the 
Internet. A weblog such as Raaze Sar be Mohr (unveiled secret) that publishes controversial 
posts about religio-political and social issues of the Iranian society, indirectly challenges 
different layers of religious authority. It is an obvious fact that professional people, like the 
blogger of Raaz who is a journalist, would not directly attack the hierarchy, specifically 
Ayatollah Khamenei, since it would result in the deletion of their weblog by the officials and in 
some cases it may even threaten their freedom and life. Also many of the weblogs and posts from 
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other weblogs that published posts about religious authority and the events that followed the 
election in 2009, have been removed by the officials or by the bloggers due to fears and security 
reasons. Some of the previously researched weblogs (as read by the author) can no longer be 
found due to this very reason. However, there are still many published analyses in the weblogs 
that indirectly criticize and challenge the authority of Ayatollah Khamenei.  
For example, Mohammad Moeini, the blogger of Raaze Sar be Mohr published a post on 
October 2009, five months after the election, in which he talks about one of the meetings of a 
group of university students with Ayatollah Khamenei. He quotes what one of the student said
38
 
in front of Ayatollah Khamenei: 
Vahidnia said: “I have been reading newspapers and magazines more seriously since five 
years ago and I have not seen any serious criticism of the supreme leader in any of them. 
There can be general criticisms by people of the society and a professional type of 
criticism by the ulama in Majlis Khobregan”… he added that the violence caused by the 
armed forces in the streets toward common people after the election would not result in 
peace and unity and therefore it seems that it is not the correct way. (Moeini, 2009) 
 
Moieni then explain one of the statements of Mousavi (the main reformist candidate from 
the reformist party in the presidential election in 2009) which refers to a valuable and persistent 
awareness that people gained in the process of the election and the uprising of the Green 
Movement despite the violence and harsh action of the officials. He indirectly wants to say that 
the charismatic authority of Ayatollah Khamenei is being challenged when a student allows 
himself to do what he did in that session. It was an ironic situation for Ayatollah Khamenei. He 
could not reject the request of that student because he had to present himself as a fair and popular 
leader. At the same time, no one could know what the student would say to Ayatollah Khamenei 
in front of all the journalists and cameras since it was not a scheduled event. Moieni tries to 
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 He was not one of the students who have been scheduled to talk in that session. He just stood up and asked 
Ayatollah Khamenei to let him say what he wants.  
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unveil the meaning of the situation for the readers and mentions that democratic appeals and the 
rise of the Green movement provide a braveness and awareness for common people to challenge 
the charismatic hierarchy and the position of wilayat al-faqih.      
Although at first glance it is obvious that the blogger is challenging the role of the 
supreme leader of Iran and presenting his reformist perspective, by looking deeper, it is apparent 
in this statement that he first approved of the status of Ayatollah Khamenei as a charismatic 
leader. By providing this example, Moieni makes two contradictory claims at the same time: first 
he describes the role of traditional religious leaders and their affirmed place of importance on the 
Internet. Therefore, Moieni unintentionally approves the status of religious hierarchy in his 
weblog. Second, he challenges the status of the supreme leader by claiming that common people 
should have a permission to question Ayatollah Khamenei. 
Jami, the blogger of Sibestab, also mentions another point under the same subject. He 
discusses the way in which the two general controversial segments of Iranian society, the 
fundamentalist and the reformists, have been confronting each other in the public sphere after the 
election.  He believes that Ayatollah Khamenei and his followers do not want to recognize the 
other half of the society. He believes that this ignorance is Ayatollah Khamenei’s Achille's heel. 
He writes: 
Mr. Khamenei speaks in a way where everyone stands on his side and there are no other 
people. But we are saying "Sir! We are the other people who stand on the other side". 
Suppose we and the Green Movement are the minority, we are still people. Is there any 
space for us in your claimed democracy? … It does not reveal any fairness for a leader to 
support a specific group, even the majority one, in a society and forget others. he must 
not undermine the minority’s rights. (Jami, 2010)  
 
Similar to Moieni, Jami presents the charismatic authority of Ayatollah Khamenei and 
then makes an oppositional perspective on his leadership. He questions Ayatollah Khamenei’s 
sense of justice, which is known as one of the primary requirements for a religious scholar to 
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become a mujtahid, or even for an Imam who is leading prayers. Jami believes that Ayatollah 
Khamenei is no longer eligible to lead the society. The notion of awareness is once again raised 
in this example. He notifies people, especially the religious segment, to review the eligibility of 
the supreme leader.           
Reviewing all these examples, it can be concluded that the presentation of religious 
hierarchy online is as strong as its offline presentation, in these Persian Shiite weblogs, similar to 
what Campbell concludes in her study of the Christian weblogs. Conservative fundamentalists 
utilize the Internet as a new platform to affirm the structure of religious hierarchy in its 
traditional and charismatic form. This statement also works in terms of the reformist-modernists’ 
perspectives. They tend to challenge the rigid religious hierarchy of the society more freely for 
broader audiences. Therefore, as Barzilai-Nahon and Barzilai (2005) explain, although religious 
fundamentalist communities, as well as others, apply this new technology as a new tool to serve 
their needs, by using the Internet, which is a secular platform, they make small changes in their 
communities. The term “cultured technology” is an exact explanation for the reciprocal impacts 
of technology and culture on each other, specifically in the layer of religious hierarchy which 
could be considered as the first dimension of a challenge in a religious fundamentalist 




 The second layer of religious authority that Campbell (2007) identifies is religious 
structure, which refers to community structure, patterns of practice and official organizations. In 
this section, religious structures will be discussed from two perspectives. The first perspective is 
Campbell’s (2007) discussion of how online religious groups manage to replicate the same 
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practices they engage in the real world online, and how the structure of the Church is thus 
repeated on the Internet. In this sense, Campbell tries to analyse any possible connections 
between the channels of authority emerging and functioning online and traditional offline 
religious structures. The second perspective is an analysis of the presentation of religious 
structure on religious weblogs. The five selected weblogs will be used to discuss whether they 
propose any kind of religious practices online, as well as how they represent Shiite structure on 
their weblogs.  
 
Online religious structure 
In reviewing all the posts on five weblogs over one year, it is evident that they do not try 
to offer any religious practices, or support specific religious online organizations and institutions. 
There are many other weblogs and websites that offer religious services which can be made into 
online religious institutions, however, these five weblogs function simply as sites for the spread 
and analysis of information in the Persian blogosphere. However, two of these weblogs, Menbar 
and Tourjan, are heavily under the influence of offline religious structures such as hawza and the 
political system of the state, as mentioned before.  
 
Presentation of religious structure 
 Religious structure covers a very broad range of organizations and practises that contain 
religious functions and content. In the Iranian Shiite state, not only are hawzas (as the seminary) 
and holy places such as shrines and mosques considered the prime institutions within the 
religious structure, but the bazaar, the political body of the state (including parties), the judicial 
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system, and the formal education system are also considered part of the body of the religious 
structure.                  
 Holy Places. Mosques and shrines embody theology, identity, uniqueness and unity, for 
Shiites. Historically, each city in Iran has a grand mosque in which Friday prayers takes place. 
Friday prayers in Islamic traditions are not a simple form of prayer with only a religious purpose. 
They also contain political meanings communicated through the sermons of the Imam before the 
actual prayer. Fundamental social issues would be considered in the sermon. It is supposed to 
illustrate the unity of the Islamic society against its enemies. Other than that, each region in each 
city has its own mosque for daily prayers and a permanent Imam to lead the prayers. After the 
revolution in Iran, mosques functioned as more than just places for prayer. They became 
institutions with several official sections for different economic, political, military, and 
educational purposes. 
The Shrines of the Imams and their heirs – mostly their children –also have structural 
functions. Since the cities in which the shrines are located have become religious cities, the most 
important hawzas were built in those cities and around those shrines. Moreover, Shiites make 
ziyarah, pilgrimages to these cities; the large numbers of pilgrims make these cities similar to 
other tourist sites around the world with the same financial, spiritual, and cultural functions. 
Cities such as Mashhad, where Imam Reza, the eighth Imam, is buried, and Qom, where the 
sister of Imam Reza is buried have become the most significant holy places in Iran. As 
previously mentioned, Qom has become the main Shiite seminary since the 20
th
 century and 
Mashhad has another important hawza run by a number of famous mujtahids. Shiites from all 
over the world come to Qom and Mashhad for pilgrimage and religious studies.   
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Holy cities in Iraq, such as Karbala, Najaf, Kazemein and Samarra, play a strategic role 
in Shiite pilgrimage and religious education as well. For the new generation of Iranians, going to 
Iraq for the ziarah of Imam Hosein, the third Shiite Imam,
39
 and other Iraqi historical and holy 
sites is a whole new concept as Iran and Iraq did not have any political, economic, and cultural 
relations for more than 20 years. Although visiting and making pilgrimage to the shrine of Imam 
Hosein is strictly recommended in religious Shiite texts and by all religious leaders, under the 
Ba’thist regime, Iraq had closed its borders to Iran since the Iran-Iraq War of the1980s. Today, 
Iranians visit the holy cities of Iraq regularly under the supervision of official organizations. 
These places function as one of the layers of religious authority that is defined as 
structure. They provide religious services and define the rituals of the pilgrimage, which is one 
of the most important parts of the religion. Also, these holy places are run by a governing body 
that includes the ulama and is accountable to the hawza of the city.  
Abtahi, one of the bloggers of Tourjan, wrote about his visit to Iraq in a post. The post 
contains an explanation of both the spiritual and social experience he had. Although he talks 
about the importance of visiting the shrines since “they are the last physical symbols of the 
Imams on earth” (Tourjan, 2009), and about his feeling of ziyarah, he mainly focuses on his visit 
to the grand Ayatollah Sistani in Najaf. It is quite impossible for common Shiites, even Iraqis, to 
visit him because of security issues. However, because Abtahi accompanied a group of official 
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 What happened in the battle of Karbala (680) to Imam Hosein, the third Imam who was also a son of Ali, made 
him symbol of devotion to God. In brief, the Caliph ordered the governor of Medina either to force a pledge of 
allegiance from Imam Hosein or kill him. The Imam was determined not to give his allegiance to the Caliph and 
knew full well that he would be killed. He moved from Mecca to Iraq. While on the way, the Imam and his 
entourage were surrounded by the army of the Caliph. On the tenth day of Muharram the battle happened, and the 
Imam, the several grandsons of the Prophet, and his companions were all martyred. What happed during that battle 
is clearly documented in history. For more than 1400 years, Shiites mourn during these days of the month 
Muharram each year. It is one of their most important rituals, which become one of the most significant symbols of 




Iranian ulama, including his father who is a cleric, he was able to visit him. This is a surprising 
and unique event in a Shiite’s life, especially because Abtahi and his father are part of a pro-
modernist-reformist group that is counted as an oppositional perspective to the current 
government of Iran. These types of visit create validity and eligibility for the modernist party of 
Iran for two main reasons: 1) Ayatollah Sistani’s office rarely accepts politicians even from the 
Muslim states, and 2) the Iranian officials who are fundamentalists, always try to present the 
modernists as an anti-Islam group, supported by the Western governments. The mere fact that 
Ayatollah Sistani accepted a visit from a group of modernist-reformists not only shows their 
importance in his view, but also reflects the group’s positive perspective on Islam. By publishing 
this post, in a popular weblog such as Tourjan, an unknown reformist cleric, Abtahi, presents his 
religious beliefs about the ziyarah of Karbala and also the visit of the grand Ayatollah Sistani.  
Therefore, the claim that the Internet gives a chance for voiceless individuals and groups to be 
heard in the public sphere is once again proven. More importantly, the Internet creates the 
opportunity for the reformist groups to gain legitimacy because the Iranian government could not 
fully control all the Internet content. If there was not the Internet, there was not any opportunity 
for the people outside the hierarchy to gain legitimacy in public sphere to prove their beliefs and 
remove the labels that the dominant power gives them.       
He describes all the details of this event from the very beginning when they approached 
the security gates, to their last minutes with the grand Ayatollah Sistani. In the post, the absolute 
authority of the mujtahids is again presented, but more than that, this post contains information 
about the atmosphere of security in these cities, with notes of the author who calls Muslims to 
become aware and united against their enemies. Abtahi does not challenge any structural patterns 
or suggest any new online tools or institutions for the Shiite pilgrimage in his post. But in 
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showing such reverence and deference for Ayatollah Sistani and the idea of making pilgrimages, 
he is significantly reinforcing a traditional religious worldview, and one that highlights the key 
role of charismatic religious leaders.  
Although he is reinforcing these traditional views, he is using a new tool for publishing 
his ideas: a weblog that had been known as a secular tool that allows people to read and talk 
about various subjects that suited their needs, interests, and curiosity. Although during and after 
the revolution of Iran, ulama have applied different kinds of technology to publish their idea and 
empower their voices, many aspects of their life remained hidden from the public sphere. The 
unknown life of the ulama, especially charismatic ones, helps make them more mysterious and 
sacred for common people. Only fifteen years ago, there were few people found in Iran who had 
seen Ayatollah Sistani’s portrait picture. Even his follower (moqaledeen( had not seen his 
pictures or had any particular information about his life; all the information they had was limited 
to Ayatollah Sistani’s fatawa, which had been published in religious books and rare journals. But 
by using the Internet and the free flow of information, each individual who visits him, or any 
other grand Ayatollah, has  the opportunity to talk or write about the time that he or she spend 
with the Ayatollah. This data gathering from the Internet is a new and non-traditional concept in 
the fundamentalist Shiite community of Iran in which everyday life of the religious leaders had 
remained veiled and unknown for so long. This may have positive or negative consequences for 
the society and the ulama at the same time. By revealing this information, people may become 
more motivated to follow the ulama or they may find that some Ayatollahs are not as qualified 
for their positions as they had originally thought. Through this medium common people may 
gain a new perspective for judging the life and function of the ulama in their society. This is 
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created by the Internet and the free flow of information and it will challenge the structure layer 
of religious authority that is run by the ulama.     
Religious rituals. Regarding holy places and religious pilgrimages as a part of the 
religious structure, there are some posts on the Menbar weblog as well. In one of the posts, 
Najmi discusses the momentous and unique experience of Hajj. Mecca and Medina are the two 
major cities for all Muslims, regardless of which sects they belong to. Each Muslim who has the 
possibility of doing so should undertake the Hajj once in his or her lifetime and visit Mecca to 
perform the religious rituals. Najmi describes the experience of being amongst more than three 
million Muslims. However, since he studies and works in the Mass Media field, he explains the 
event from this specific perspective. Najmi writes about how news agencies from around the 
globe cover this event creatively and criticises the Iranian news agencies that repeat all the same 
pictures and stories each year. He does not describe the structure of this religious event; rather, 
he includes nine hyperlinks that connect this post to other websites such as CNN's website, 
Youtube, The Boston Globe, the official website of a non-religious Iranian woman who 
photographed the event, and some other Iranian websites, all of them having reported Hajj from 
their own viewpoints. 
There are at least three remarkable points in this post. First, although he criticises the 
method and the content of the Iranian reports of the event, he mentions that “the Western media 
agencies come to Hajj to present Islam deceptively for the world!” (Menbar, 2009). He takes the 
same perspective that the official Iranian government, specifically Ayatollah Khamenei, takes in 
talking about and judging the West, and especially the United States. This means that he uses 
new technology to connect the different layers of religious authority online – including 
hierarchy, ideology and structure – to offline sources. This means that 1) Hajj as one of the most 
85 
 
important religious rituals is presented in his weblog, 2) he repeats the same claim about the 
West, as an enemy of Muslims, and 3) by repeating this, he emphasizes on the beliefs of the 
supreme leader, and other officials of the hierarchy using his weblog.   
Second, the usage of hyperlinks in the weblogs can be considered as presenting a 
challenge to religious authority because they not only refer to external sources that are not 
Islamic sources, they disturb the discipline of traditional learning about a religious pilgrimage. 
As Barzilai (2003) mentions, fundamentalist religious communities follow strict disciplines that 
are embedded in the collective consciousness through spiritual authorities, law, systems of 
learning and education, and daily practices. The learning procedure has rigid boundaries based 
on sacred texts and religious leaders’ interpretations of the texts. By using hyperlink technology, 
the traditional hierarchy in the traditional system of education is broken since anyone who has or 
does not have any religious education can search for and write about religious beliefs and rituals 
publically. Muslims and non-Muslims have access to all religious sources and can publish their 
own viewpoints without any specific restriction. Hyperlinking is a non-linear and interactive tool 
that can repudiate the limitations of traditional sources and lead to new interpretations of 
religious concepts and rituals. In this sense, Najmi refers to the non-Muslim news agencies who 
reported on Hajj:  
It is interesting how the CNN and BBC persist in sending their journalists, even Christian 
ones, to Mecca and Medina, [while it is forbidden for non-Muslims to enter these holy 
cities], and even more fascinating when they reach the high-secured locations to cover the 
event more accurately so their audiences can have a better sense of what is going on in 
Hajj. Even the Boston Globe photographs the event from above with its giant helicopter. 
(Menbar, 2009)  
 
As mentioned, by making links in the paragraph to the CNN website, Boston Globe 
website and a video on Youtube, Najmi breaks the discipline of referring to traditional sources 
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for getting information about religious rituals. He basically provides a non-traditional and non-
Muslim source for the readers to find out about a purely Islamic ritual, namely Hajj.  
Third, he refers to a female photographer as a source that presents the Hajj pilgrimage 
very well. Although Newsha Tavakolian is a famous freelance Iranian photojournalist, by 
mentioning her and linking the post to her work, Najmi exemplifies another dimension of tension 
with regard to religious authority and the Internet: the challenge to patriarchy (Barzilai-Nahon & 
Barzilai, 2005).     
By referring to the work of a professional Iranian female and describing her work as a 
masterpiece, Najmi’s post contributes to a new quiet revolution happening under the surface of 
the traditionally religious context of Iranian society in the face of this new technology. Najmi 
does not refer to Newsha as a religious source for getting information, however, rather he 
admires her photography, which captures a religious event. In fact, while he criticizes the official 
Iranian journalists for their boring and unprofessional coverage of the Hajj, he is quite excited 
about Newsha’s braveness, skills and persistence in overcoming the difficulties she encountered 
with security forces in order to do her job. This point should be considered as one of the small 
changes that are happening in cyberspace to moderate the fundamentalist view of religion, 
including Shiite Islam. This is an important point because by becoming an official religious 
cleric, Najmi is not traditionally allowed to talk about a female photographer and her braveness 
on the actual menbar. The patriarchal system still does not desire this type of viewpoint. 
However, by including this subject in this post, Najmi shows that even a fundamentalist 
conservative segment of the body of hawza, is under the influence of the Internet. In fact so 
much that he is working to limit the patriarchal discourse, even if he is not fully aware of. This 
further shows that incremental changes have finally begun. What is more important in this 
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example is that by acknowledging Newsha’s work, Najmi, as a fundamentalist religious scholar, 
legitimizes females to become active members of the religious society. While he cannot promote 
this view in the conventional media, the Internet allows him to picture women in a different way 
which gives them more credit and legitimacy to be heard and seen in the society. As Barzilai-
Nahon and Barzilai (2005, p. 28) write: 
[The Internet] is perceived as a platform to communicate within and outside the 
community in ways that empower feminine identity…the Internet has created better 
opportunities for feminine voices to be heard in religious fundamentalist contexts, 
although these opportunities are framed within the communal context and its hierarchy. 
 
There is another example in this regard in Tourjan that specifically talks about the 
daughter of Prophet Muhammad, entitled “Fatima is not only Fatima; she is also the daughter of 
Khadija.”
40
 In this post, Morteza discusses that although Prophet Muhammad is father of Fatima, 
believed to be the perfect pattern for Muslim women in their religious life, Fatima also has a 
great mother whose role should not be ignored in her religious upbringing. Morteza says: 
Khadija said “no” to all of the incorrect aspects of Arab culture and rituals when she 
married Muhammad before he was chosen to be the Prophet by Allah. She was a great 
woman who had a very hard time during her life because it took a long time for Arab 
society to accept Muhammad as the Prophet. As a rich business woman, she spent all her 
wealth for the distribution of Islam and all that she left for Prophet Muhammad was 
Fatima. Fatima was the result of the marriage of two anti-traditions: Prophet Muhammad 
and Khadija. Fatima like her mother was one of the most influential women in Islam's 
history. Her role as a political/religious opposition toward the Caliphs made her a 
political activist who did not choose to be quiet about the malfunction of the religio-
political system of Caliphate and Muslims society.  
  
By talking about Islamic history from a different feminine angle, Morteza presents a 
hidden aspect of Muslim history which is built by women. The status of Fatima and Khadija are 
not ignored in the traditional and fundamental perspectives, but referring to them as the source of 
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 The Prophet’s first wife Khadija, mother of Fatima, who is known as the mother of all Shiite Imams and the 
source of Shiism.  
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anti-traditionalism and political activism is not a familiar concept. This perspective has been 
exposed in Shariati’s speech and lectures about Fatima and Zainab
41
 and continues in other 
religious intellectuals’ thought. Its appearance on the weblogs reveals that this challenge to 
patriarchy can be considered even more seriously due to the Internet’s broad range of audience 
and free access. 
In this sense, special attention should also be paid to the countless number of female 
bloggers in Iran who blog to analyse and explain the problem of patriotism and strengthen their 
feminine identity in the fundamentalist community. Therefore, the Internet primarily strengthens 
the weak feminine voices in Iranian society; whether or not men of the society talk about their 
needs and beliefs, they find a way to publish their ideas publically. For instance, a weblog such 
as Gol-dokhtar, which is written by female bloggers, talks about different subjects related to 
women. The weblog is published by a group of young religious women who gain the opportunity 
of being heard publicly by using the Internet. Furthermore, this weblog provides a public sphere 
where women actively share their viewpoints and argue about their social and religious 
dilemmas. This phenomenon creates a predictable tension in the dimension of patriarchy as an 
important element of a religious fundamentalist community.  
Religious practices as presented by women bloggers. As Bastani states: “findings show 
that women may use the Internet to voice disputes with the patriarchal hierarchies in their 
fundamentalist religious communities, all the while remaining loyal to their community culture 
and discourse” (as cited in Barzilai-Nahon and Barzilai, 2005, p. 28). This is the case for 
religious females in Iran, who accept the structure of the official religious hierarchy and remain 
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 One of daughters of Ali and Fatima who was present in the battle of Karbala and her harsh speech in Yazid’s 
palace is known as the most reliable historical source of the battle.  She is known as the messenger of Karbala and a 
great figure of sacrifice and strength. 
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loyal to the rules of the patriarchal society. However, since they are educated and belong to a 
new generation of Iranians, they tackle new subjects and problems, showing hidden aspects of 
their religious beliefs that had not been revealed publically before the Internet era. Therefore two 
issues should be pointed here: first, Shiite female bloggers have been breaking the traditional 
barriers that avoid them to present in the public sphere. Second, Shiite female bloggers have 
been invisibly and softly breaking the rules of the fundamentalist society. Two examples from 
Gol-dokhtar will clarify these points. The first one is when one of the writers of this weblog 
describes how it was hard for her to find a fitness center that meets her religious condition and 
needs in Qom, where she lives. She explains that she is sensitive about the music that is played 
during the work out classes. A while later she writes that the hawza has opened a fitness center 





 and inappropriate dress codes.
44
 She continues: 
This summer I've become super active in sports and I am so pleased that I could finally 
find a place to work out. I have been thinking about different abilities that each sport 
requires and how many girls have the required conditions and facilities to do 
sports…nowadays there are many debates about why Iranian women cannot participate in 
international sports competitions in swimming, soccer, and boxing. I wish they put their 
energy towards providing facilities for a broader range of Iranian women instead of 
thinking about a limited group of athletes. They should try to improve the level of 
women’s health by building fitness centers around the country. Why should women put 
themselves on severe diets to get thinner like deformed models when they can become 
healthier by doing sports?   
 
It may seem that this is not a religious-related example but it directly presents the 
fundamentalist-conservative perspective of Iranian officials. Due to their type of reading of 
religious laws, women of the Muslim community cannot participate in international sports 
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 Music is a controversial issue in fiqh. Many mujtahids believe that listening to music is not religiously allowed.    
43
 Since religious women wear hijab, it is not allowed to get pictures and videos of them without their permission. 
Obviously in a women-only workout place, they take off their hijabs but they are always worried about cellphone 
which have cameras.  
44
 It is necessary for Muslim women to have appropriate and modest dress code. However, it is not a rare event to 
see religiously inappropriate dress codes in streets and particularly in workout places.  
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competitions because they are not allowed to take off their hijab. Even if they do not practise 
Islam individually, they must wear it when they officially represent the Islamic Republic of Iran 
abroad.  
 This can be considered both as a hierarchical and patriarchal issue. The government 
enforces the Islamic dress code for women even if they are not Muslims. By making this ruling, 
the government not only restricts women inside Iran, but also it prevents them to represent Iran 
in any athletic, artistic, or other types of contests, outside the country, without hijab. All the 
athlete and artist women who formally represent Iran in other countries have to wear hijab, even 
though they may not believe in to it. It is also a patriarchal issue, since there have been more 
sport facilities built for men than women, due to these restrictions. There is an unfair sexist 
division with regard to the quality and quantity of sport facilities. In addition to female 
restrictions, men have access to more facilities of higher quality. In this post, although the 
blogger does not challenge the hierarchy and the structure of the laws regarding women, she 
obviously questions the unfairness of the dispersion of sport facilities and the different benefits 
for men and women in society.  
Women bloggers against patriarchy. The second example is a post about the role of 
Iranian women during the Iran-Iraq war in 1980s. In this post the blogger talks about the women 
who were injured during the war and became disabled thereafter. She begins the post with a link 
to an official website containing the statistics of these women and the percentage of their 
disability. She mentions that most of these women live in underprivileged cities that were 
involved in the war. These cities would have had little to no access to appropriate health or 
educational facilities. She then makes a link to another news websites which reported the speech 
of the vice-president of the Martyrs and Warfare Disables’ Foundation (Bonyade Shaheed) who 
91 
 
refers to these women as ideal types of freedom and braveness. He praises the women who 
fought besides their men to defend their religion and land during Islam’s history, specifically 
after the revolution of Iran. The vice-president mentions that people need to learn from these 
women and spread the culture of sacrifice they exemplify. The blogger then continues:  
Although we are proud of these martyr and disabled women, we should not ignore that 
they are now living in an underprivileged situation. Their braveness is a result of the 
break that they made in the structure of gender inequality of our society. But, still those 
men who are in charge of society believe that “the most important duty (jihad) of a 
woman is to take care of her husband” and “jihad is not obligatory for women.”
45
 They 
don't say that it's "not obligatory" but that it's "not prohibited" for women to take part in 
jihad. You! Whoever is in charge, while you feel proud of them, you have to answer the 
question of whether these women will receive any help from you and whether you feel 
responsible for their life. What have you done for the future of these women? (Gol-
dokhtar 2009) 
 
This post contains at least four important points: first, it obviously challenges the leaders 
of society and whoever is in charge for being careless in the way they have dealt with the lives of 
women who are believed to be an honour to society.  
Second, the blogger refers to the abilities and braveness of the women as compared to the 
men. She then criticizes the structural gender inequalities that have been promoted by the 
society. In this, she is challenging the patriarchal element of the fundamentalist community.  
Third, the blogger provides a new interpretation of the Shari’a law regarding jihad for 
women. As it is believed, based on several Quran verses and ahadith from the Imams, women 
are not required to participate in war while it is mandatory for men to defend their land and 
religion. Here, the blogger emphasizes the point that, although it is not the duty of women to 
participate in war, they are not prohibited to do so. This means that, not only does the blogger 
breaking the patriarchal boundaries, but she is also revising the traditional way of interpreting 
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 These two quotations are ahadith from Shiite Imams.   
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these verses and ahadith using a new feminist perspective. This is an example of a challenge to 
another layer of religious authority: the authority of the text, as Campbell called it since hadith is 
one of the main written based sources of authority after the Quran that has to be taught and 
interpreted in a traditional way as the fundamentalists believe. Therefore, here, not only the 
blogger apply the ahadith outside of the traditional context, she also interprets it in a way she 
thinks is correct.        
Fourth and most importantly, as Barzilai-Nahon and Barzilai (2005) explain, by 
reviewing all the posts that have been studied, women of these religious communities do not 
completely challenge the dimension of fundamentalism by using the Internet, rather, they 
emphasize their religious beliefs. As Bunt (2000) mentions, they are apt to create a new desirable 
religious public sphere online where they can raise their voices to re-define, promote advertise, 
and practice their religion in a modern reasonable and peaceful public sphere. They have indeed 
cultured this technology to fulfill their needs based on their religious perspective. However, as 
Barzilai-Nahon and Barzilai (2005) point out, this technology makes a series of small and hidden 
impacts on the fundamentalist society and its people’s perspective as well. As mentioned above, 
different characteristics of religious fundamentalism, in addition to at least two layers of 
religious authority, are being challenged in the context of this post. Moreover, blog posting is not 
the only way allows female to present their ideas. Their presentation is even more serious in the 
weblogs published by males. They interfere with the patriarchal discourses that dominate the 
atmosphere of the religious context, by making comments on the posts and attending online 
discussions. As Barzilai-Nahon and Barzilai (2005) sate “cultured technology, mitigates the 
possible conflict between feminism, religiosity and community” (p.29).     
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The education system: hawza as the main body of religious structure. Although religious-
based education has a long history in Iranian society, after the establishment of Dar al-Fonoun, 
less people choose that system for their children. An important incident during the Qajar Dynasty 
that affected the situation and authority of the ulama was the establishment of Dar al-Fonoun as 
“the first higher school, in Tehran, which included both technical-scientific and military 
instruction. It was mainly taught by European teachers with the aid of local translators” (Keddie, 
2006, p. 49). This directly influenced the Iranian traditional pedagogical system that had always 
been run by clergies. The traditional system of learning was founded on the religious Islamic 
culture that promoted oral transmission through a student-master relationship between the 
common people and the elders and religious teachers (Anderson 2003; Turner, 2007). It was a 
face-to-face system of learning in which only divine science had been taught by the ulama in 
maktabs (traditional schools).  
With the emergence of new schools such as Dar al-Fonoun, the pedagogical authority of 
the ulama was threatened, although they still ran the howzas for divine science and Islamic 
philosophy. Therefore, not only did the role of religious theologians become more 
professionalized and centralized in howzahs, a division emerged between the common people 
who studied in the modern system of schooling and those who studied at howzeh for divine 
knowledge.  
Paying attention to this division is critical for at least two reasons. First, Keddie (1980) 
categorises Iranian society of the mid-19th and 20th centuries as a dichotomy with regard to 
religious beliefs and practice. On one hand, there was a traditional group of people, who were 
among bazaar bourgeoisies, that received education throughout the traditional system and were 
overwhelmingly Islamic. On the other hand, there were people who were educated in a modern, 
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Western-based educational system. As Keddie explains, these people, most of whom lived in the 
bigger cities such as Tehran, were sceptical of religious beliefs and followed almost a wholly 
Western lifestyle. The Shiite ulama had lost their authority over a considerable number of urban 
inhabitants during that period of time.   
Second, during and after the Revolution of 1979, whether they studied in the traditional 
or modern system, the young generation of Iranians united in supporting the religious and 
charismatic authority of Ayatollah Khomeini to become their revolutionary leader. Moreover, the 
particular socio-political atmosphere of the 1970s also resulted in the formation of a new class of 
“religious intellectuals” who consisted of students from the modern schooling who were 
religious at the same time, such as Ali Shariaty. Most of them were among the successful 
students in the universities who continued their professional education in European universities. 
These groups, such as the Religious-Nationalist and Freedom Movement parties, were also 
among the supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini.  
Nowadays, the common people have little information about hawza, its bureaucracy, the 
fields that are being taught there, and its general atmosphere. Still, it is one of the most powerful 
and influential institutions of Iranian society and has a great impact on the political relations of 
the state.  
Iranian newspapers, news agencies and cyberspace today talk about news related to 
hawza and analyse the issues related to it. The mujtahids and the ulama have their own 
webpages, whether run by themselves or by their offices. They enter the online public sphere 
simply to be connected to the newer generation that uses the Internet regularly, but also to reach 
the Muslim Diaspora. However, they find that cyberspace provides abilities and capacities that 
the hawza had not experienced before. Now it is hard to find a popular mujtahid who does not 
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have a webpage. Their websites provide a great opportunity for their followers to ask them 
Shari’a-related questions. There is a huge body of fatawa to be found on the Internet. Many 
articles in various formats are now available online. Also, news about the ulama’s life and works 
can be discovered online, either on their individual websites or on others. Some ulama provide 
services such as consulting online or downloading sections of religious books and podcasts. 
Although these services are now online, they can be considered as a continuation of the offline 
hawza system, with regard to the content and structure of the websites. As Bunt (2000) mentions, 
authority in the virtual space of the World Wide Web is still projected from the real world.  
One of the most popular weblogs to visit to get information about the hawza’s system and 
the ulama is Tourjan. As previously mentioned, the bloggers of this weblog are both advanced 
students in hawza. They mostly focus on historical events and analyzing the hawza and the 
ulama’s social activities and their political involvement in Iranian society. There are also posts 
that discuss current events in hawza and its educational system. One of the posts in the time 
period of this study was a review of a sociological book called Development and Conflict by an 
Iranian sociologist, Dr. Rafipour. As Fathi describes, there is a section in the book that Rafipour 
wrote based on his observations and attendance in the hawza of Qom. Rafipour analyzed the 
education system and its bureaucracy, and the clerical life in hawza. Fathi presents several quotes 
from the book that describe hawza well. In one part, Rafipour wrote about the system of “making 
notes” in the hawza classes and made a criticism of the common system. He mentions that he 
saw students who made notes word by word without paying much attention to the reasoning and 
the content of the teacher’s ideas (a mujtahid), and this makes them unable to make any 
arguments about the content. He also mentioned that the students in hawza classes do not make 
96 
 
notes in the same way that Western scholars do.
46
 He thought that the notes students made and 
their notebooks in hawza classes were not in a reasonably neat order. Fathi makes the following 
comment on this notion: 
Rafipour is unfamiliar with the education system in hawza since he did not study there. 
What he mentions in his book is not a common way of making notes in hawza classes. 
However, making this type of notes is suggested from grand mujtahids such as Ayatollah 
Buroujerdi, who believe that since not all students can attend the grand Ayatollahs 
classes, the students who do attend must make “word for word” notes to present to others. 
This way, they can talk and discuss the content of the texts and it makes for an even more 
fruitful discussion. Furthermore, in each hawza class there is a student or a group of 
students who are more knowledgeable and make comments on the teacher’s thoughts. 
Many constructive arguments often occur in this way in hawza’s classes. (Tourjan, 2010)     
  
Rafipour earlier wrote “hawza has an interesting atmosphere for scientific debates compared to 
the Iranian university that mostly do not have this unbiased and productive spirit”. Moreover, he 
mentions that,  
The relationship between people in hawza is respectful and it contains no trivial issues. 
The sense of collective cooperation is very high, something unattainable or unimaginable 
in universities. Also the discussions are deep and follow very reasonable patterns. 
(Tourjan, 2010) 
 
Presenting all these quotations from Rafipour illustrates that Fathi wants to describe the 
hawza’a environment and education system from a scientific perspective. But more than that, he 
wants to make people more familiar with the hawza system of education. What common people 
think about the hawza is that it is a strict traditional form of education; it is based on a close 
master and pupil relationship. But this post shows that this perspective is not completely right. 
Although the authority of the ulama and the structure of the system are rigid, the scientific 
atmosphere of this education system is productive, constructive and improving. What makes this 
post noteworthy is that it describes a very important part of the structure, one of the layers of 
Shiite authority. It shows that Shiite authorities are utilizing the Internet for its continuation 
                                                 
46
 Dr. Rafipour received his degrees from Germany.   
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online and more than that, the new online ground has been used as a defensive and protective 
device for it. As Barzilia-Nahon and Barzila (2005, p. 27) write, “the community is able to affix 
the hierarchical order online, not less than offline”. Moreover, it is important to note that how a 
religious weblog becomes a space for criticizing and analysing an academic and university style 
book.  
Digital menbar. Similar to Jewish and Christian traditional rules, Islam has a strict 
discipline for educational, judgmental and other social aspects of religious life. As previously 
mentioned, in the education system, hawza is the main organization where ulama study to 
become mujtahids and religious leaders. One of the focal concepts in Islamic educational system 
is menbar. Menbar is the mosque’s equivalent of a pulpit from which religious leaders, ulama, 
mujtahids, deliver sermons. It identifies the status of the teacher over the students, or a mujtahid 
to common people. As Bunt (2000) writes, “in the age of the Internet, the menbar can be 
digital… the khutba [sermon] can be online” (p. 104). This statement applies in investigating in 
these five weblogs. For instance, since the bloggers of Tourjan and Menbar are students in 
hawza, they utilize their weblogs as menbars to argue about social and religious issues. One of 
the posts in Tourjan was published after Ali’s release from the jail. It is an interview with Ali 
published in Talabe [scholar] Weblog, which talks about how, when and why Ali was captured. 
While answering one of the questions, Ali mentions that  
I saw weblog as a menbar. The only difference among these two is that menbar is a one 
way tool while weblog is a reciprocal one. I believe this is my duty, as a religious scholar 
to run an online menbar… if religious scholars do not use the Internet, they will lose one 
of the most influential grounds for their religious advertisement. Their power on the 
Internet depends on their online performance and the functionality of their weblogs. 





Although Ali refers to a traditional and disciplined way of teaching, by using this new 
technology, he applies the functions of online technology such as hyperlinks, search options, and 
receiving comments from the audience, all of which are in contrast with the strict and linear base 
of the traditional religious system of hawza. Referring to other offline and online sources while 
discussing religious issues and getting feedback from audiences are among those notions that 
cultivate challenge to religious fundamentalism. In addition, a remarkable segment of the 
audiences are females who cannot attend male classes in hawza (there is a separate hawza for 
women). As a result, in these types of weblogs women make comments, critiques and participate 
in discussions, which rarely happens in the offline Shiite society of Iran. Multiple voices – from 
different weblogs who discuss the same dilemmas and issues –also disrupt the hierarchical order 
of the Shiite fundamentalist perspective of the educational system. Therefore, as previously 
discussed, the Internet can profoundly challenge the traditional disciplines of religious 
fundamentalist society.  
 
Religious Ideology  
Ideology, the third layer of religious authority online, which for Shiite includes the main 
principles of the religions, such as Tawhid (Unity of Allah), Nabowwat (Prophethood), Imamate 
(authority of the heirs of the Prophet including the subtitles of Infallibility and Salvation), Adalat 
(Justice of Allah), Qiamat (Afterlife) and other concepts such as Spiritual realms, is not directly 
discussed in these five weblogs. The bloggers do not try to interpret or challenge these topics.  
 
Same ideology, different interpretations 
Almost all these weblogs are published by religious bloggers, except for Sibestan whose 
blogger does not declare anywhere in his weblog that he is a Shiite Muslim, but whose posts 
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shows that he is a believer who reads Islam differently from the traditional perspective. 
Therefore, the statement by Lawrence’s findings in his study of the reciprocal influence of 
cyberspace and Islam is confirmed. He found that traditional perspectives and conservative 
approaches are mainly reinforced through the structure, images, and beliefs communicated 
through the Internet (Lawrence, 2002, p. 240). However, there are many indirect, conscious or 
unconscious themes and statements in these weblogs, that seek to explain that are explaining the 
ideology from a different angle, which may challenge the traditional perspectives. For instance, 
in the month of Muharram of the same year of the election, the Green Movement had decided to 
protest one more time to show its existence and objection against the official regime, to 
commemorate all who had been killed after the election and all who had been captured in the 
terrifying atmosphere of armed groups in the streets. In that situation, Moieni published a post 
about Imam Hosein in which he used a quotation from Dr. Shariaty, the most famous religious 
intellectual before the revolution, who said: 
You won’t be able to analyze the battle of Hosein if you do not understand the socio-
political condition of his time. Hosein was responsible for the revolution that had been 
led by his grandfather, Muhammad, and then had continued by his father and brother. In 
the time of Hosein, the revolution whose result was the establishment of a pure Islamic 
government based on justice and reality did not have any supporter under the Umayyad’s 
Caliphate. Islamic values had been forgotten, the rulers were spoiled, and the political 
system, which had complete domination over the religious and social life of people, was 
rotten. In that situation, there was no other choice for Imam Hosein than to rise against 
that system despite the martyrdom that faced him. This was the only option that would 
wake up the society and warn them of what the deterioration was doing. His martyrdom 
was a tool like a sharp sword against injustice. In the battle field, when all his family had 
been killed, Hosein raised his voice and asked for any help and companionship despite 
the fact that he knew there was no one to support him. He yelled “is there anyone who is 
ready to support and help the Phophet’s family?” of course there was no one at that time, 
but Imam Hosein was calling to the future; for the history of humankind; for us. He asked 
us to help him.   
 
The main point that can be inferred from this passage is that, although the regime of Iran 
declares that it has an Islamic perspective, it is rotten from inside. The Green Movement should 
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raise its voice and react against the misleading ideology that has been introduced as Islam during 
the years of Ayatollah Khamenei’s leadership. The post talks about Imamate and the ideology 
behind the actions of the Shiite Imams and the true meaning of jihad which is a sacred war (in 
this case, against injustice). On the other hand, the fundamentalist bloggers, such as Gol-dokhtar’ 
writers, saw this situation differently. They believe that the supporters of the Green Movement 
disobey the wilatay al-faqih who is the current heir of the Imams. Based on their perspective, 
whoever challenges the authority of the supreme leader, violates the Imams’ authority. Therefore 
on the day of Ashura when the Green Movement protested in the streets, the government and the 
fundamentalist traditional segment of the society took it as a non-respectful action and it resulted 
in the riot police attacking the demonstrators. However, in a post, one of the bloggers of Gol-
dokhtar says: 
Why are religious modernist bloggers such as Tourjan being quiet about what the 
followers of the Green Movement have done? These protestors did not respect wilayat al-
faqih and public morals and properties. They just ruin the atmosphere of Muharram's 
sorrow … it seems that the religious modernists have forgotten that Imam Hosein 
revolted against injustice, tyranny, and distortion of religious concepts. (Gol-dokhtar, 
2009) 
              
In contrast with what Campbell (2007) finds in her study of the Christian and Jewish 
online communities, the Iranian Shiite blogosphere does not have any claim about “the 
community of one voice” (p. 1057). As these different weblogs show, Iranian Shiites have a 
different reading and interpretation of the same religious ideology. While the reformers interpret 
Imam Hosein’s battle as a model for the reformist to be brave against the regime which misleads 
the Muslim society, fundamentalists believe that the reformists are rebels who follow anti-
Islamic ideologies, which is in contrast with Imam Hosein’s viewpoint.      
As Lawrence (2002) mentions, the image of Islamic concepts such as jihad and 
martyrdom in the “straight path” (sirat al-mostaqim which contains all religious beliefs and 
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practices that lead Muslims to meet Allah), are strongly presented on the blogosphere though the 




Validation of discussions through the Quran and hadith  
The selected weblogs do not contain any kind of interpretation of the verses of the Quran 
or hadith. However, in various cases they refer to some Quranic verses and present some hadith 
within their posts to prove their points, which also shows the authority of religious texts. For 
instance, a post on Menbar refers to a hadith from Imam Ali providing evidence for the authority 
of Ayatollah Khamenei as the true figure of wilayat al-faqih in the structure of the political 
system of Iran. By presenting a hadith from Imam Ali, Najmi compares Ayatollah Khamenei’s 
authority and his performance with that of Imam Ali in the very first stages of the establishment 
of the Muslim society. In the post that he writes about the 20
th
 anniversary of the beginning of 
the leadership of Ayatollah Khamenei, he states: 
Two of the Prophet’s main followers, Abbas and Shaybah, were talking about their 
honours in the Muslim community. Imam Ali asked them "what are your honours?" 
Abbas answered "I have a special honour that no one else has: I bring water to the people 
who are coming to Mecca for Hajj". Shaybah said "I am one of the repair men who 
reconstruct Ka’ba and I have its key". Ali told them, with modesty, "I have an honour 
that neither of you have: I did Jihad with my sword, until you believed in God and the 
Prophet". 
   
By mentioning this hadith, Najmi explains that none of the current opposition leaders (in Iran) 
have the same honour as Ayatollah Khamenei, because none did anything of the same value for 
the improvement of the Islamic Revolution of Iran. These kinds of comparisons have a long 
history in Iranian politics and social commentary. Through this assessment, Najmi tries to 
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conclude that the Islamic Republic is operating a government based on a very pure essence of 
Shiite beliefs. 
In Sibestan, Jami frequently refers to the Quran as the main source of the authority of 
Shri’a and ethics in the Shiite community of Iran. However, his way of interpreting the Quran 
and his understanding is different from the official government’s viewpoint. In a post after the 
election, he criticizes the Friday prayers of the Imam of Mashhad. Referring to one of the verses 
of the Quran, the Imam accused the protesters of the Green movement of being "Evil’s ally," in 
contrast with "Allah’s ally." Jami believes the Imam inferred a reversed meaning of those verses 
in the Quran which talk about Hizb a-Allah and Hizb a-Shaytan (the party of God/the party of 
Evil). He writes:  
Being fair, just, and peaceful is necessary for whoever refers to and adapts the Quran 
verses…there is nothing more sinful than lying about the Quran… and the worst lie is 
labelling of believers by a person who introduces himself as a supporter of the Quran. 
The Quran suggests to argue about the problems in a peaceful and reasonable way and 
more than that, in the Quranic context, all life is a contest for being good and peaceful 
(Kahf, verses 7)…the Quran that I and most of the Muslims know is the Quran that 
promotes good will and peace. Muslims have to obey the Quran and not reverse its 
meaning to what they need to… also in many verses the Quran tells the Prophet not to 
worry about people’s beliefs since they are free to choose between wrong and right…in 
this sense, Friday Imam’s speech does not follow the way that is suggested in the Quran. 
These types of ulama are very far away from the pure dogma of the Quran. He labelled 
the protesters as the party of Evil because of their demonstration on the Ashura day, but 
he forgot all the illegal actions that the army and police have done to people in the name 
of Islam.     
 
As it is obvious, Jami refers to the Quran as the most eligible and authentic text for 
guiding the life and behaviour of Shiites. He also believes that the commands and concepts 
suggested in the Quran are solid and have to be obeyed truly and completely by whoever 
believes in Islam. However, his take is different from that of the Imam. Therefore, he not only 
questions the authority of a Friday Imam, he also provides a different understanding of the holy 
text. Therefore, he affirms the authority of the text but from a different angle. The most 
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important point here is that Jami criticizes the hierarchy by the most trusted religious text, the 
Quran. He did not use any modern or secular sources to explain how the hierarchy tries to 
deceive people by interpreting the holy text of the Quran in a misleading way. The Friday Imam 
was positioned in this role as a professional in religious matters; however, Jami believes that he 
failed in his job since he interpreted the Quran in a wrong way. In this post he mentions that the 
Quran is the ultimate source of authority in Islam, therefore, he uses the authority of the texts to 
criticize the hierarchy. This is one of the complex situations in the Persian blog postings where 
the bloggers use one layer of authority, the textual, to override the other layer, the hierarchical. In 
these situations, the bloggers use the official and acceptable sources of authority, not any outside 
sources, to challenge different layers of authority particularly the hierarchy. It also shows that 
how non-traditional authority, a journalist from the Iranians of the Diaspora, criticizes traditional 
authority, the Friday Imam, using this new technology. This is one of the moments that reveal 
the tendency of liberalization in the society.  
These two examples from Sibestan and Menbar, which are taken as cases of the fourth 
layer of authority that Campbell (2007) suggests, authority of religious text, can also be 
considered as indications of the dimensions of religious fundamentalism (Barzilai-Nahon and 
Barzilai, 2005) that have been affected by the Internet: hierarchy and discipline. As they 
mention, religious fundamentalist communities are characterized by a tight hierarchy which is 
the representative of the divine. In this sense, accusing one of the most important roles, a Friday 
prayer Imam of wrong doing, is one of the many examples of challenges to this religious 
authority. What is more important here is the role of the Internet in creating this opportunity for 
Jami, who lives abroad, to listen or read the speech of one of the Friday Prayer’s Imams of 
Mashhad, and to write about the way that he interpreted the Quran. It is true that none of the 
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people who attended the Friday prayer will read Jami’s post, but the impact of these challenges 
have gradually opened new windows for criticizing the dominant reading of the religious texts.   
The post in Menbar is an example showing how the Internet enhances the communal 
discipline and enables collaboration by the users to empower the communal consciousness 
(Barzilai-Nahon and Barzial, 2005). By turning to a reference from a hadith, Najmi stabilizes the 
existing communal discipline in the fundamentalist community. Shiite ulama and clerics use the 
same method in their sermons, study classes, on the actual menbars, and in their professional 
books. The Internet has just added a new stage for the scholars to empower the traditional 
discipline of religious dogma. Furthermore, in this way, “the internet has become a significant 
element in the communal social capital, for good and for bad” (as cited in Barzilai-Nahon and 
Barzial, 2005, p. 29). Najmi tries to explain the values of Shiite culture and consequently adapt 
them convincing the reader to accept the supreme leader’s high status and impact on Shiite 
society. This means that the Internet assists in the maintenance of communal religious discipline 
by preserving basic cultural attributes.  
However, at the same time, using the same religious methods and concepts online may 
have some dissimilar consequences for society. Since the essence of the Internet, the openness 
and free flow of information, allows a wide range of audiences to read these types of religious 
texts on weblogs and it also allows them to make different conclusions regarding the blogger’s 
thoughts. The audience also has the opportunity to make comments on the blogs’ posts and 
question the interpretation and understanding that the blogger offers. In this way, although the 
Internet has become a religious service provider in the Iranian community, it can also enforce the 
canons of modernity on the fundamentalist community. In this sense Najmi and other religious 
bloggers, by bringing ahadith to prove their thoughts, provide the opportunity for the readers to 
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become involved in interpreting the holy texts and thinking about them in a new context. This 
development is not acceptable in the traditional and disciplined education system of the religious 
fundamentalist community; it disturbs the traditional discipline of hawsa’s education system. 
This is also one of the complex consequences of the penetration of religious society by the 
Internet.                
 
The Constitution as a religious text 
There are also discussions on Tourjan about tafseer books (interpretation of the Quran), 
their historical background and their authors, the ulama. However, this section will not focus on 
this type of post. Rather, it will concentrate on a post that represents the linkages between state 
politics and laws in the current era and religious texts. As Campbell (2007) suggests, to 
investigate the authority of religious texts online one should pay attention to the role and 
perceptions of religious text on the Internet. That means the role that traditional religious texts 
serve offline, and whether they play the same role as a source of authority in the online religious 
context that they do offline (Campbell, 2007).   
There is a post published on Tourjan under the title “The Story of ulama and the 
Constitution,” which focuses on one of the most religious reference texts in Iran, “The 
Constitution of the Islamic Republic.” The Constitution of Iran is based mainly on the core 
beliefs of Shiite Islam and the ideology of wilayat al-faqih, which was proposed by Ayatollah 
Khomeini.
47
 All the existing laws are based on Shari’a and all proposed bills should be approved 
                                                 
47
 The role of clerics in law: The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran repeats many times that the basis of 
political life and loyalty is Islam and that the goal of political activity is the realization of an Islamic vision. 
Furthermore, the constitution states the basis upon which the ulama claim their right to rule. It also specifies the 
mechanisms by which the ulama will secure the right to define what is Islamic as well as the legislative means in 
particular by which they will enforce this definition. The Constitution specifies the institutionalization of clerical 
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by the majority of the parliament. However, at least one council (Shoraye Negahban, the Council 
of Guardians),
48
 and sometimes one more council,
49
 have to review the proposed bills to 
authenticate them from the perspective of Shari’a, before they are approved      
As with other posts on Tourjan, the framing of this article is historical-analytical. The 
bloggers want to explain four main points here. First, they provide a brief history of the ulama’s 
approach to the Constitution during the Constitutional Revolution (in the last century) and 
explain that the main Shiite mujtahids during that time supported or at least did not oppose this 
approach. Second, they discuss how the idea of wilayat al-faqih became one of the principles of 
the Constitution of the Islamic Republic after the revolution. Third, they focus on the role of 
Ayatollah Khomeini, as a charismatic leader, in stabilizing the Constitution, although some 
traditional mujtahids, at that time, believed it was an unnecessary institution that only moves 
society toward secularism. Therefore, the traditional perspective emphasised that the Shari’a law 
is enough for a Shiite Islamic state. However, Ayatollah Khomeini approved the establishment of 
yet another council, Tashkhis Maslahat Nezam (Expediency Discernment Council of the State), 
because even a Shiite-run state needs accurate and applicable laws. Finally, the notion of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
rule through wilayat al-faqih (the rule of the jurist). The authority base of the Constitution is in the hands of those 
who know God and who are reliable in and responsible for matters having to do with what He permits and forbids. 
Wilayat al-faqih’s power flows through a kind of charismatic authority, known as a kind of divine election. This 
means that after a long time of opposition, the ulama formally became rulers, based on a sacred law and in a semi-
democratic state. Their charismatic authority has become routinized and institutionalized as a quasi-rational and 
quasi-traditional government, since it has a constitution and election yet the laws are based on a religion. 
48
 The Council of Guardians: the twelve appointed members have the authority to veto legislation they judge to be 
inconsistent with the Constitution or Islamic law and they also screen all potential candidates for the Assembly of 
Experts, the Presidency, and the Parliament. 
49
Shoraye tashkhis-e Maslahat-e Nezam (Expediency Discernment Council of the State). The Expediency 
Discernment Council of the State was established in 1988, on the orders of Ayatollah Khomeini, to overcome the 
differences of views between the parliament and the Council of Guardians. Article 112 of the 1989 amended 
Constitution states: The Expediency Discernment Council of the State shall be convened at the order of the Leader 
to determine such expedience in cases where the Council of Guardians finds an approval of the parliament against 
the principles of Shari’a law or the Constitution, and the parliament in view of the expedience of the State is unable 
to satisfy the Council of Guardians, as well as for consultation in matters referred to it by the Leader, and for 




routinization of the charismatic leadership is a remarkable point in this post. As the bloggers 
claim, Ayatollah Khomeini wanted the authority of the Constitution and law over the state, rather 
than the authority of an individual. In a common procedure, he allowed the routinization of 
charisma and yet institutionally preserved a key measure of charismatic authority by putting it in 
the Constitution. However, he believed that wali al-faqih should screen and monitor all the 
activities and performance of the society and lead the people toward God. In this regard, the post 
also contains several quotes from the mujtahids. For instance, Ayatollah Makarem says,  
Imam [Ayatollah Khoemini] strictly suggested that any issue in the state should be 
analyzed under and by the Constitution. He may have believed that “wilayat al-faqih” is 
above the Constitution but he never acted on this belief. He always firmly emphasized the 
structure of the Constitution. (Tourjan, 2009) 
 
Thus, the Constitution is presented as a religious-based text that also contains a modern 
meaning of law and order. This post strongly refers to the role of this text as an authoritative 
institution in society that should be obeyed under all circumstances and by all people, even the 
supreme leader. Similar to what Campbell (2010) finds in her study, bloggers of both weblogs 
supported their personal claims and arguments by employing pure religious texts, such as hadith, 
as well as more social religious-based texts, such as the Constitution. There are many religious 
weblogs in the Persian blogistan that contain information and analyses about religious texts 
which strictly affirm the authority of these texts. However, the number of weblogs that question 
the authority of Shiite religious texts should not be ignored.   
So far, by looking at these findings, it can be concluded that as Campbell says, the 
Internet has become a new public sphere for presentation of different levels of religious 
authority. As it is discussed through the examples, hierarchy and structure, the two of the four 
religious authority layers, are strongly reflected on these blog postings, regardless of the 
bloggers’ level of religiosity or their political view. Based on these findings, an important 
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question was raised: have any kinds of tensions occurred within the interchanges of the 
fundamentalist Iranian Shiite community and the Internet as a secular technology? Does the 
regime completely dominate the public sphere of the Internet? Are there any specific instances 
that show religious fundamentalism is being challenged through the Persian blogosphere?  
Applying the framework of Barzilai-Nahon and Barzilai helped these questions to be 
answered. Using their four dimensions of religious fundamentalism reveals that hierarchy, 
patriarchy, discipline, and seclusion have not been drastically challenged by the users of the 
Internet in the selected cases of the Persian blogosphere since both fundamentalist and modernist 
groups apply this technology in the way that fulfills their goals. However, many subtle changes 
have happened because of this new communication tool which creates a free public sphere for 
the presented of various understandings of religious beliefs. Also it cannot be ignored that the 
Internet helps the public sphere of the society to be more liberalized.   
In blogistan, religious hierarchy is presented and mostly affirmed by the bloggers, but 
there are specific posts found in the weblogs that challenge the authority in particular ways; for 
instance referring to the unofficial sources and historical documents may challenge the current 
condition of the religious hierarchy in the Iranian society. Patriarchy is one of the main subjects 
that have been challenged in many ways online, although the society is still dominated by this 
perspective. The voice of women cannot be censured from a free public sphere of the blogistan 
and their issues and perspectives have been appeared progressively online. Discipline as the third 
dimension of religious fundamentalism has been also challenged by users’ online activity. 
Whether they are from the reformist group or fundamentalist one, the bloggers who apply 
ahadith or other religiously specific knowledge in their posts, disturb the traditional discipline of 
hawza’s education system. They use the religious knowledge out of the original context and this 
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opens the door for any person on the net to expose his or her own understanding of ahadith in the 
way that he or she wants without having special knowledge. Moreover, who has the eligibility to 
adapt the historical Islamic incidents from the days of the Prophet to analyse the current social 
dilemmas? It seems that in the Internet era, anyone has the opportunity to do so, based on his or 
her logic. In terms of seclusion, although the Internet can increase the seclusion in a 
fundamentalist community, it may be decreased by the users’ online activity to find new sources 
of information about Shiite Islam and other religions that are not acceptable by the regime. These 
sources can be found in some of the postings that have been looked through. For example, the 
posts that contain the religious intellectuals’ statements about Ayatollah Khomeini is considered 
as an inacceptable and external source, since the regime categorizes religious intellectualism as 
an inacceptable perspective.  
Overall, although this research shows that religious authority still dominates the online 
public sphere, specifically inside Iran by using filtering, censorship policies and applying more 
coarse actions toward the oppositional opinions, there are many occurrences that explain the 












The purpose of this thesis was to explore how religious bloggers, specifically Shiite 
Persian bloggers, challenge or affirm the existing religious authority through their blogging 
content. This was accomplished by looking at which authority layers are presented and what 
possible tensions exist in the interchanges between religion and the Internet in Iranian society.  
To answer the question of which layers of authority are presented in the Persian 
blogosphere, the framework of Campbell’s studies (2007 and 2010) was mainly followed. She 
categorises four layers of religious authority: hierarchy, structure, ideology and texts. Also, to 
find any possible dimension of tension, Barzilai-Nahon and Barzilia’s (2005) identification of 
four major areas in which tensions can occur between the Internet and fundamentalist forms of 
religion: religious hierarchy, patriarchy, discipline and seclusion, were applied.   
While early studies of religious authority on the Internet suggested that the Internet might 
mostly be used by religious users to challenge traditional sources of religious authority, this 
study shows that the Internet can instead serve as a source for empowering existing forms of 
religious authority. This study provides evidence that religious users spend a considerable 
portion of their discourse online affirming, rather than challenging, religious leaders, structural 
bodies, theologies and core texts. However, there is evidence that using this new technology, as a 
modern form of public sphere, has influenced the beliefs of the fundamentalist groups and the 
way they present their thoughts as well. Moreover, more religious scholars become active 
interpreters of religious texts, specifically with regard to the current social problems, which the 
traditional hawza’s education system prevents them from doing.          
The major points that have been found in terms of the presentation of the four layers of 
Shiite religious authority on Persian blogosphere are as follows:  
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Religious hierarchy is identified with roles such as religious leaders and charismatic 
figures. This layer of religious authority is appears frequently on the weblogs, in both the 
reformists and fundamentalist ones. It seems that religious hierarchy and charismatic figures play 
a critical role in the everyday life of these bloggers. Therefore, the first subject that they refer to 
when they want to analyze the society is religious leadership. Persian Shiite bloggers in this 
study invoked many traditional sources of authority, namely appeals to the grand mujtahids and 
ulama. Although the presentation of the hierarchical authority becomes the main issue of their 
posts, fundamentalist bloggers discuss why they support the hierarchy as much as the reformists 
criticize the religious hierarchy directly or indirectly.   
Based on the findings, it seems that religious bloggers, regardless of their fundamentalist 
or modernist view points, largely affirm the charismatic-traditional form of religious authority, 
only in different ways. While the fundamentalist weblogs demonstrate existing authority based 
on traditional ways of understanding religious texts and ideology, the reformist-modernist 
weblogs apply new ways of understanding Shiite dogma and religious authority, which is more 
compatible with contemporary modern society.  
Although the above claim is true, after analysing the Persian blog posts, it is found that 
there are some particular moments when the qualification and the eligibility of the charismatic 
leadership are questioned with or without intention. This is because the Internet is not a neutral 
communication tool. It affects the content of the communication since it is free to access and 
mostly free of powerful controls. The Internet’s secular essence influences the information that 
has been published on it. Therefore, even if the fundamentalist users are not fully aware of its 
essence and effects, by being active in the online public sphere discussing charismatic 
leadership, they indeed become a part of the liberalization process in their society.  
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As stated at the beginning of this thesis, based on Weber’s (1968) explanation - 
charismatic authority is defined by all the powers and qualities that a charismatic figure 
possesses. Fundamentalist blogs attempt to affirm the charismatic authority of the leaders by 
posting their analyses using religious beliefs and texts to convince others. The process of 
convincing others explains that the charisma does not have the quality of influencing the crowd 
anymore. In fact, this situation shows that the charisma needs to be proven by his particular 
followers for the common people who do not believe in his legitimacy anymore. Therefore, 
although the fundamentalist bloggers try to affirm the qualification and the authority of the 
charismatic figure, the quality of the relationship between the charismatic leader and society, are 
being challenged.  
Another aspect of the challenge is when charismatic authority gradually transforms to 
another type of authority; whether to the rational or traditional form, as it is discussed in 
examples from the weblogs. When the religious bloggers try to explain the traditional or rational 
bases of religious authority in the religio-political system of Iran, they indeed challenge the 
charismatic essence of it. This is because, as it is revealed in these weblogs, they increasingly 
recognize that they need to define a more traditional or rational system of authority in which the 
religious leader is accepted by public opinion, whether based on the traditional bonds or rational 
institutions such as the Constitution. These types of challenges are mainly revealed in the 
religious-modernist weblogs; for instance, when the bloggers of Tourjan explain the traditional 
style of the leadership of the ulama based on the historical documents and when they explain 
rational bases of the theory of wilatay al-faqih through the thoughts of Ayatollah Khomeini in 
their interviews with the religious intellectuals. Modernist bloggers, directly or indirectly, 
question the situation of the charismatic leader and the system. They make their effort to move 
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public opinion toward a more rational and democratic system of charismatic power. This way, 
the religious hierarchy may be weakened but still perseveres.   
However, since religious authority can be presented in traditional, rational or charismatic 
forms, and it is not restricted to any of these forms, we cannot conclude that through the weblogs 
or any other kind of online social media, religious authority is actually being challenged in 
significant ways. We only can claim that the Internet, as a rational and secular technology, has a 
series of unpredictable effects on the religious fundamentalist community of Iran, such as the 
creation of an open public sphere for sensitive issues and the increase in the number of religious 
theorists and interpreters. At the same time we should pay attention to those effects that the 
religious society has on the Internet. There are some examples in this study of how the Internet 
becomes a ground for discussing the traditional or charismatic types of religious authority by the 
fundamentalist users. This proves the fact that although fundamentalist groups apply this 
technology in the way that fits their needs, the religiously fundamentalist society of Iran and the 
Internet have mutual effects on each other. It shows the tendency of the society toward 
liberalization with regards to religious issues.   
Religious structure is identified with the mosque and other holy places, the religious 
education system, as well as religious practices and pilgrims which are situated in the second 
rank of presentation on the five weblogs. In this layer, both fundamentalist and modernist 
bloggers are apt to connect the offline structure of education system of hawza and religious 
rituals to the online authority. Although, they use the Internet as a new public ground to re-define 
traditional religious structure, there are evidences that this new technology has gradually 
influenced the traditional structure. For instance, by looking at the posts by female bloggers, it 
has been found that religious women find a public sphere to empower their voice based on their 
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religious beliefs and needs. However, not only their presentation in the free public ground of the 
Internet can be considered as a way to weaken the patriarchy, but also their statements consist of 
feminist claims in essence. From the findings of this study, even the fundamentalist male 
bloggers break the rules of patriarchy by writing about women’s issues and acknowledging their 
professional work. By respecting the women’s presentation, they legitimize the feminine voices 
in religio-political discussions as well as women’s issues.   
Religious ideology and religious text have appeared less frequently on these five 
weblogs. Since these bloggers are not the formal representatives of any of the ulama or a 
religious institution, they do not tend to interpret religious texts or define the principal concepts. 
They use religious texts or ideology only when the bloggers need to provide a religious proof for 
their assertions.   
 Based on these findings, we can reveal that although there are thousands of non-religious 
Persian bloggers who post radically anti-religious discussions from inside and outside Iran, the 
power of religious bloggers should not be underestimated. This notion leads us to another 
remarkable point here. There is some evidence showing the formation of a new type of religious 
authority in the study of these weblogs. Since there are still few weblogs that analyse the 
hierarchy of the religious leaders from within, the bloggers, who have clerical backgrounds, are 
considered to be reliable sources of information with more accurate criticisms. Therefore, it is 
predictable that after a while a new form of online authority will be shaped that can at least 
influence the online religious Shiite environment. This is partly happening right now since by 
searching with any keyword (in Farsi) about hawza and related issues in a search engine like 
Google.com, the first source that appears is Tourjan.com. This gives the authors of the weblog 
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the power to distribute their own understanding and viewpoints more easily and influence 
religious authority by challenging or even affirming it.  
 Another aspect of the shaping of new authorities online is provided by the weblogs, 
websites, and other online social networking communities run by Iranians in the Diaspora. This 
seems obvious that the bloggers and the managers of these weblogs and websites have 
unrestricted access to the Internet and their voices are heard more effortlessly than those bloggers 
in Iran who are facing filtration and censorship of the Internet. However, except from some 
examples from the blog postings discussed in this study, this subject needs more effort to be 
documented and analysed.  
 This thesis has also explored and conceptualized the interaction of religious 
fundamentalism and the Internet with regard to four dimensions: hierarchy, patriarchy, discipline 
and seclusion, as Barzilai-Nahon and Barziali (2005) suggested. Based on what was studied, 
religion, even in its fundamentalist form, does not perceive the Internet with irreversible 
hostility. In the Shiite Iranian context, this new technology is perceived as a potentially 
welcoming tool that can be used to disseminate religion internally and externally. Additionally, it 
is being utilized for political mobilization by both controversial Iranian parties. 
Overall, “cyberspace is dynamic in nature, fast and easy to access, providing users with 
more discretion, power and wealth of communication possibilities” (Barzilai-Nahon and Barzilai, 
2005, p. 37). These features have given the Internet a special value among religious believers. 
The Internet has assisted the religious communities, specifically the fundamentalist ones, to 
survive in the modern era. This is because the Internet is a tool that supports them to provide 
their religious needs. As a result, the community has become more multifaceted and pluralized, 
but also more empowered and more efficient by making the Internet a complementary space to 
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the offline community. As we see in this study, the Internet penetration has not drastically 
changed the basic foundations of religious authority in the community, but it surely has created 
small but progressive changes in the society.   
Following Barzilia-Nahon and Barzilai (2005), this research analyses the blog posts to 
find any possible tensions between the Internet and Shiite religion in the areas of hierarchy, 
patriarchy, discipline and seclusion. The main point identified in this regard is that religious 
hierarchy is not radically threatened by the Internet in Iran. However, since the Internet is a 
public sphere with a flattened hierarchy, more people have the opportunity to challenge or affirm 
the existing hierarchical system, and more plurality will be found in terms of interpretation of the 
religious dogma.  
Also, it seems that patriarchy is subjected to challenge in the Internet era. Even among 
hard-liners, such as the members of the fundamentalist party in Iran, the voice of women is 
becoming heard and their work is more appreciated and seen. Women, specifically the highly 
educated ones, who empower their voices do not solely discuss female issues, they raise serious 
questions for the political and religious systems of the society.  
Regarding discipline, the situation is the same: the Internet disturbs the traditional 
religious education and interpretation system through the use of hyperlinks. Moreover, the 
mostly free access to religious websites/weblogs, texts and other sources challenge the existing 
discipline in Shiite learning and information gathering traditions. For instance, referring to the 
usage of ahadith in the blog postings, it should be noted that it is obviously an anti-traditional 
way of stating ahadith since the great ulama always believe that only religious scholars should 
state a hadith in its context for those who have the minimum knowledge of Arabic language and 
other related knowledge.        
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As for seclusion, the Internet may threaten the religious community’s seclusion. Since the 
Internet provides open access to other cultures and religions, it also creates a free ground for 
discussing sensitive religious issues. Whether being anonymous or identified, Iranian bloggers 
can refer to unofficial and disapproved sources to discuss religious matters. But, the Internet can 
play a contradictory role as well. Official leaders and fundamentalists lead people to follow their 
own online sources. This means that religious authority can preserve its power through the use of 
this very modern device. 
As Scholz et al. (2008) concluded in their study of Islamic podcasts, although the Internet 
provides the opportunity for expressing a diversity of opinions and interests challenging the 
traditional structure of religious authority, the content of the Persian blogistan is still oriented 
toward the traditional and classic scholarship and beliefs that form the basis of religious 
authority.  
Referring to the study of Scholz et al. (2008), the Internet has four major outcomes for 
Iranian society that have been revealed through this analysis of blog postings. First, the 
accessibility and flexibility of the Internet facilitates the participation of individuals and groups 
in the overall Islamic discourse which would have been ignored before the spread of this new 
means of communicating. Second, the Internet facilitates the increase in the quality and the 
quantity of Shiite counter public areas, where people can debate sensitive issues with less fear. 
Third, the emergence of an Iranian Shiite online landscape is not totally distinct from those 
authority structures existing in the real world. However, it seems that the existing structure has 
been challenged in some aspects. The Persian blogosphere has gradually unveiled new aspects of 
the Iranian religio-political structure that had not been revealed in the public media inside Iran. It 
could also present a new face of Shiite Islam to the world, especially if one considers the roll of 
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the Iranian diaspora, as Anderson (2003) asserts. Fourth, the new online public sphere provides 
new opportunities for presenting religious authority and its layers. This creates a new context and 
innovative types of discourse in the Shiite community of Iran. This is another small and 
unpredictable change that the Internet imposes on the fundamentalist community of Iran.  
In this study, there are three major instances that are considered more significant in 
liberalizing the public sphere of the Shiite fundamentalist community of Iran using the Internet: 
1) The bloggers, regardless of their political viewpoints, use the outside or unofficial sources of 
information that consist of alternative views of Shiite practices, principles and religious leaders. 
The role of the Internet in the exposition of this information cannot be ignored either. 2) The 
unseen aspect of the life of the ulama is now can be seen though the Internet. The information 
about their personal life and activities is as reachable as their religious works and perspectives. 
Their characteristics and life are not visionary anymore. 3) The Internet allows non-traditional 
authorities, whether the journalists or unknown religious scholars, to use one layer of authority to 
criticize the other layers. For instance, they state the verses of the Quran (textual authority) to 
attack the religious leaders (hierarchical authority). 4) The presentation of women’s voices is 
another strong instance in this study. How women expose their issues and needs and how they 
are presented by male bloggers, as legitimate sources in religio-political matters, are remarkable 
points in this study.  
These are only a few examples that illustrate the point that the Internet challenges, in 
subtle ways, some aspects of the religious authority. It should be also mentioned that users of this 
free and secular technology, for example the fundamentalist groups, may not be fully aware of its 
liberating effects on their society and beliefs. This conclusion is in line with Barzilai-Nahon and 
Barzilia’s point about how the Internet is gradually changing the essence of the fundamentalist 
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communities in a delicate way. However, it should be also mentioned that the Iranian political 
regime uses more coercive ways to maintain the dimensions of fundamentalism in the society. 
The political regime still strongly controls people’s online activities in any way possible, but on 
the flip side, as Barzilai-Nahon and Barzilai say, just by using this technology, particularly by 
using certain features of this technology, such as weblogs, the subtle process of liberalization is 
taking hold in the society. 
 
Future Work 
This preliminary study sets the stage for a more sophisticated research project in the area 
of religion and the Internet in the Iranian Shiite community. More research needs to be 
conducted to review additional Persian weblogs, from inside and outside Iran, that make posts on 
religious authority and religious dogma, in order to analyse the contemporary reciprocal 
influence of the Internet and religion. One of the most important areas that should be studied in 
more depth is the role of the Iranian Shiite diaspora and the role of religious intellectuals in 
creating new understandings and interpretations of religious texts. Their role becomes more 
important and influential because the Internet allows them to publish their perspectives freely 
and common people can therefore have access to them easily. Therefore, a more in-depth study 
of the notion of religious authority in conjunction with the Internet is needed.     
Also a more intensive study can be conducted about women bloggers, which could 
potentially open doors to the analysis of how patriarchal traditions have been vigorously 
challenged, changed or affirmed in online communities of Shiite Iranians. This, undoubtedly, 
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Shiite Hadith collection 
The four major hadith collections for Shiites are: 
 Al-Kafi by al-Kulayni,  
 Man la Yahzarohol Fagih by al-Sadugh 
 Tahzib al-Akhlagh by al-Tousi 
 Al-Estibsar fima khtolefa men al-akhbar by al-Tousi 
 
Other collections: 
 Al-Bihar al- Anvar by al-Majlisi,  
 Al-Istibsar by al-Tusi,  
 Wasael al-Shi’a by al-Ameli 
 
Shiite Books of Tafseer: 
 Al-Meezan by Tabatabayie 
 Nemooneh, by Makarem Shirazi 
 Tafseer Majma al-Bayan by al-Tabarsi 
 
 
 
